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Abstract
One essential quest in cryptography is the search for hard instances of a given computa-
tional problem that is known to be hard in the worst-case. In lattice cryptography we
are in the unique situation that we have found a way of picking random instances which
are at least as hard as well-studied lattice problems in the worst-case. At the same time,
no attack running in subexponential time is known to break these problems, even for an
adversary using quantum computers. Virtually all public-key schemes in use today are
subject to such attacks, and the development of quantum computers is actively pursued,
so it is prudent to investigate lattice-based alternatives.
There are two fundamental open problems in lattice cryptography today and this thesis
contributes to solving them. First, there exists a widely used efficiency improvement that
allows for trapdoors whose asymptotic keysize and evaluation time are both quasilinear
in the dimension of an associated lattice. This is accomplished by restricting oneself to
lattices with special structure, so-called ideal lattices. This entails the use of newer security
assumptions, but these have not been analyzed thoroughly so far. We start this work by
comparing the class of ideal lattice problems with its general counterpart in terms of size.
Affirming folklore, we find the number of restricted instances among all instances to be
asymptotically negligible for those classes of lattices suggested for practical use.
The second open problem is that while the connection to worst-case problems is well
understood, the practical hardness of the related average-case problems is not. Specifically,
there have been parameters suggested for practical usage, where current lattice basis
reduction algorithms can solve these worst-case problems, but the related average-case
problems, which these are reduced to and which represent the basis of practical security of
the cryptosystems, are completely infeasible. In most cases, this lack of understanding has
lead either to a very conservative choice of parameters, or none at all. This in turn makes
it impossible for the resulting lattice schemes to compete with their counterparts based on
other paradigms. We further the understanding of this practical security and at the same
time improve the efficiency of several common related cryptographic schemes. Among
other things, we find that for the SWIFFT compression function, solving certain problems
closely related to finding collisions is easier than previously thought and we suggest efficient
replacement parameters. We propose a novel zero-knowledge identification scheme that,
to our knowledge, beats all competing post-quantum schemes, even those based on other
paradigms. Possibly most important, we help to tighten the efficiency gap between lattice
encryption schemes that are provably secure and the acclaimed ad-hoc encryption scheme
NTRU. This is done by unifying many recent developments into a new provably secure
design and providing a comprehensive analysis of practical security, which together results
in a great leap of efficiency.
ix

Zusammenfassung
In der Kryptographie ist eine der wesentlichen Aufgaben die Suche nach schweren Instan-
zen eines Berechnungsproblems, von dem man weiß, dass es im Worst-Case schwer ist. In
der Gitterkryptographie sind wir in der einzigartigen Situation, einen Weg gefunden zu
haben wie man zufa¨llige Instanzen auswa¨hlt, die mindestens genauso schwer wie wohlun-
tersuchte Gitterprobleme im Worst-Case sind. Gleichzeitig ist kein Angriff bekannt, der
diese Probleme in subexponentieller Zeit lo¨st, selbst wenn der Angreifer einen Quanten-
computer verwendet. Praktisch alle asymmetrischen Kryptographieverfahren, die heute im
Einsatz sind, unterliegen solchen Angriffen, und die Entwicklung von Quantencomputern,
mit denen man die Angriffe praktisch realisieren kann, wird aktiv verfolgt. Es ist daher
langfristig gesehen ratsam, gitterbasierte Alternativen zu untersuchen.
Es gibt aktuell zwei grundlegende offene Probleme in der Gitterkryptographie, und
diese Arbeit tra¨gt zu ihrer Lo¨sung bei. Das erste Problem betrifft eine weit verbreitete
Effizienzsteigerung. Diese ermo¨glicht die Konstruktion von Trapdoor-Einwegfunktionen,
deren asymptotische Schlu¨ssella¨nge und Laufzeit beide quasilinear in der Dimension eines
assoziierten Gitters sind. Dies wird durch die Einschra¨nkung des Verfahrens auf Gitter mit
spezieller Struktur erreicht, so genannte Idealgitter. Dies ist jedoch nur mo¨glich, wenn man
von neuen Sicherheitsannahmen ausgeht, deren gru¨ndliche Untersuchung noch aussteht.
Wir beginnen diese Untersuchung, indem wir die Klasse von Berechnungsproblemen in
Idealgittern mit ihrem allgemeineren Gegenstu¨ck in Bezug auf deren Gro¨ße vergleichen.
Wir finden in den praxisrelevanten Gitterkategorien, in U¨bereinstimmung mit allgemeinen
Vermutungen, heraus, dass die Anzahl der beschra¨nkten Instanzen unter allen Instanzen
asymptotisch vernachla¨ssigbar ist.
Das zweite offene Problem betrifft die Berechnungsprobleme im Average-Case, die als
direkte Sicherheitsgrundlage vieler praktischer Verfahren dienen. Es ist bekannt, dass diese
Probleme asymptotisch mindestens so schwer wie verwandte Worst-Case-Probleme sind,
aber daru¨ber hinaus ist wenig u¨ber ihre Robustheit gegenu¨ber praktischen Angriffen be-
kannt. Insbesondere gibt es praxisrelevante Parameter, fu¨r die alle bekannten Algorithmen
die entsprechenden Average-Case-Probleme nicht lo¨sen ko¨nnen, die zugeho¨rigen Worst-
Case-Probleme aber teilweise schon. In den meisten Fa¨llen hat diese Wissenslu¨cke dazu
gefu¨hrt, dass beim Vorstellen neuer Gitterverfahren die Parameter entweder sehr kon-
servativ ausgewa¨hlt oder u¨berhaupt nicht angegeben wurden. Dies wiederum macht es
unmo¨glich, die entsprechenden Verfahren mit Konkurrenten zu vergleichen, die auf ande-
ren Paradigmen basieren. Wir erweitern das Versta¨ndnis der praktischen Sicherheit meh-
rerer verbreiteter kryptographischer Verfahren und verbessern gleichzeitig deren Effizienz.
Unter anderem finden wir heraus, dass fu¨r die Kompressionsfunktion SWIFFT die Lo¨sung
bestimmter sicherheitsrelevanter Probleme, die eng mit der Suche von Kollisionen zu-
xi
Zusammenfassung
sammenha¨ngen, leichter ist als bisher angenommen und empfehlen hinreichend effiziente
Ersatzparameter mit denen das Problem den urspru¨nglichen Annahmen gerecht wird. Wir
schlagen ein neues Zero-Knowledge-Identifikationsverfahren vor, dass unseres Wissens alle
konkurrierenden Post-Quantum-Verfahren u¨bertrifft, insbesondere auch solche Verfahren,
die auf anderen Paradigmen basieren. Als vielleicht bedeutendstes Ergebnis tragen wir da-
zu dabei, die Effizienzlu¨cke zwischen beweisbar sicheren Gitterverschlu¨sselungsverfahren
und dem vielgepriesenen Ad-hoc-Verfahren NTRU zu verkleinern. Dies erreichen wir, in-
dem wir viele der ju¨ngeren Entwicklungen zu einem neuen beweisbar sicheren Design zu-
sammenfassen und eine umfassende Analyse zu dessen praktischer Sicherheit durchfu¨hren,
was zusammen einen bedeutenden Effizienzsprung bei gleichbleibender Sicherheit in der
Praxis zur Folge hat.
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1
Introduction
The usage of public-key cryptography has become commonplace in our lives. The security
of virtually all such cryptographic schemes in use today rests on either of two problems,
namely integer factorization and discrete logarithms. Due to an algorithm by Shor, the
computational difficulty of both these problems can be overcome by large enough quantum
computers [Sho94]. Physicists have successfully been working towards the goal of building
such a quantum computer. Looking ahead, we will at some point be required to diversify
our computational assumptions.
Several mathematical fields offer computational problems suitable for cryptography.
The prominent ones today are multivariate polynomial systems, coding theory, and lattice
theory. We will concern ourselves only with the latter, because it carries the additional
and unique benefit that in order to guarantee security of associated cryptographic primi-
tives, one only requires the computational hardness of lattice problems in the worst-case.
Primitives based on computational problems from other fields always require the hardness
of average-case problems following some distribution usually chosen heuristically by the
designers and attackers of the primitive.
For the case of lattice-based cryptography, Ajtai proposed a method of randomly choos-
ing instances of computational problems suitable for cryptography, which are secure as-
suming only the hardness of associated worst-case problems [Ajt96a]. These instances are
now known as SIS problems and their unusual connection to worst-case problems has led
to their usage for many basic cryptographic primitives such as hash functions, signature
schemes, identification schemes, and more. Later, Regev presented a similar connection for
a related method of choosing random instances, but on the dual lattices. These instances
became known as LWE problems [Reg05a]. These are suitable for constructing more ad-
vanced primitives such as public-key encryption, hierarchical identity-based encryption,
and many more.
There are two fundamental problems in lattice-based cryptography today. First, there
exists a widely used efficiency improvement which entails the use of newer security assump-
tions. However, analyzing these throughly is still an open problem. The efficiency gain is
based on the fact that some additive groups can be extended to rings. Restricting the afore-
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mentioned SIS and LWE problems to such groups, i.e., those which are themselves ideals,
greatly improves both efficiency and key-sizes for the resulting schemes [LM06, LPR10].
It was also shown that a connection to appropriately restricted worst-case problems still
exists, however, these restricted variants are new and much less studied, so for the moment
their benefits come at a cost of faith.
The second problem is that while the connection to worst-case problems is well under-
stood, the practical hardness of the related average-case SIS and LWE problems is not.
There is a wide range of parameters for which current lattice basis reduction algorithms
can solve the worst-case problems we discussed, but the related average-case problems,
which these are reduced to and which represent the actual basis of security of the cryp-
tosystems, are completely infeasible. In most cases, this lack of understanding has lead
either to a very conservative choice of parameters, or none at all. This in turn makes it
impossible for the resulting lattice schemes to compete with their counterparts based on
other paradigms.
This thesis contributes to solving these problems. After explaining the basic notions of
lattice-based cryptography, we present the following four results.
Density of Ideal Lattices. We start in Chapter 3 with the first thorough analysis of the
only known drawback when restricting SIS and LWE to ideals, which is common practice
for current schemes. In our analysis, we compare the related classes of worst-case problems
in terms of size as the parameters defining both classes tend to infinity. The size of the
restricted variants is always found to be negligibly small in this comparison. However, we
also find that no practical algorithm is known to take noticeable advantage of this gap.
Several papers relate to our work, since they make use of worst-case problems in ideal
lattices as basis of security for new cryptographic schemes. A comprehensive survey of
these schemes is given in Lyubashevsky’s PhD thesis [Lyu08b]. Though many authors
suggest that the problems in ideal lattices may be easier, none of them give a quantitative
comparison of worst-case problems in general lattices and ideal ones as we do.
Mathematically, our results are a new interpretation of the work by Murty and Van
Order [MVO07], who analyzed the same objects we deal with but for purely mathematical
reasons, namely giving explicit bounds for the Riemann zeta function at s = 1. We, on
the other hand, provide a cryptographic context where their results give new insights.
Lattice-Based Compression Functions. In Chapter 4, we introduce the lattice-based com-
pression function SWIFFT proposed by Lyubashevsky, Micciancio, Peikert, and Rosen
[LMPR08]. It is the major internal part of the hash function SWIFFTX, which in turn
was a long running candidate for the hash design competition SHA-3. We propose an
efficiency improvement for SWIFFT, which is universally applicable to all schemes based
on SIS and comes at no cost. We also propose a parameter generator for SWIFFT and
present an analysis which shows that finding `2-pseudo-collisions for SWIFFT is not as
hard as previously thought. We finish by proposing appropriately efficient replacement
parameters for which pseudo-collisions are hard to find.
Numerous recent results relate to this. For example, in [MR09], Micciancio and Regev
suggest an improvement for schemes based on the LWE problem. It comes with the same
benefits that our proposition has for SIS-based schemes, i.e., in both cases the problems
require less description bits. However, they do not provide a proof that for all relevant
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parameters the improved and original problem are asymptotically equivalent. They also
do not apply their improvement to the case of ideal lattices, since no reduction from
worst-case problems for LWE in ideals was known at the time.
There is also an eminent study on the practical hardness of several lattice problems by
Gama and Nguyen [GN08] related to our work. Like us, they have performed extensive
experiments in order to predict the behavior of lattice basis reduction algorithms. They
do not, however, cover the SWIFFT lattices in their analysis. Furthermore, they only
provide relative hardness statements in terms of the Hermite factor of a lattice problem,
and make no link to, say, an absolute runtime required to achieve such a factor on a given
computer.
Lattice-Based Zero-Knowledge Identification. Having thoroughly analyzed SWIFFT, we
continue in Chapter 5 by using it in conjunction with a recent zero-knowledge identi-
fication scheme from coding theory by Cayrel and Ve´ron [CV10] to construct a lattice
counterpart. Due to the efficiency inherent in SWIFFT, our streamlined adaptation has
smaller communication costs than its coding partner, while keeping the same soundness
error of 1/2 and perfect completeness. At the time of writing, we are not aware of any sim-
ilar post-quantum primitive that has less communication cost. The adaptation is also of
independent interest, because it can be used as a roadmap for translating simple schemes
based on the syndrome decoding problem into lattice ones.
There exist many propositions for post-quantum, zero-knowledge identification schemes.
In lattice cryptography, one of the most prominent ones has been proposed by Kawachi,
Tanaka, and Xagawa [KTX08]. Like our scheme, it is an adaptation of a code-based
primitive, in their case one by Stern [Ste93]. Starting from Stern’s scheme, which requires
more communication than Cayrel and Ve´ron’s, they naturally end up with a proposal
that is less efficient than ours. Also, their focus is on showing the theoretical possibility
of deriving a scheme based on worst-case hardness assumptions, rather than on analyzing
the practical costs of their scheme in comparison to other proposals.
Another well-known example of lattice-based identification is a scheme by Lyubashevsky
[Lyu09]. His scheme is different in the sense that its proofs of authenticity are only witness-
indistinguishable and not zero-knowledge, which is somewhat weaker. Lyubashevsky’s
scheme has no soundness error, but a small completeness error of 1 − 1/e, creating the
undesirable possibility that an honest prover is rejected. Lyubashevsky’s proposal is well
tailored towards the Fiat-Shamir heuristic for transforming an identification scheme into
a signature. So, it does have a more efficient signature counterpart than ours. As an
identification scheme, however, it is slightly less efficient.
Lattice-Based Encryption. Finally, in Chapter 6, we wrap things up by analyzing the more
sophisticated LWE problem, as proposed by Regev [Reg05a], in the same way we analyzed
SIS in the context of SWIFFT. The LWE problem is much more versatile in terms of
schemes that are built upon it, so for clarity we focus on basic public-key encryption. We
unify several recent developments concerning LWE into a new variant of the encryption
scheme which features public keys that are 10 times smaller than previous propositions. At
the same time, we propose a new two-phase hybrid attack on LWE which combines lattice
basis reduction and an extended enumeration variant of Babai’s nearest plane algorithm
to achieve better results.
3
1 Introduction
Several papers contain studies of the concrete hardness of lattice problems. For instance,
the one we mentioned before by Gama and Nguyen [GN08]. They performed a compre-
hensive study of the behavior of basis reduction algorithms for various families of lattices.
However, aside from the Goldstein-Mayer distribution for very large moduli (which are
not typically used in cryptographic constructions), their work did not attempt to docu-
ment the behavior of basis reduction on q-ary lattices, the class of lattices related to SIS
and LWE. In addition, they were not concerned with the use of a reduced basis to solve
bounded-distance decoding problems (of which LWE is a special case), where additional
algorithmic ideas and trade-offs are possible.
Another related work is a recent survey by Micciancio and Regev [MR09], who proposed
parameters for various lattice-based schemes from the contemporary literature. Their pa-
rameters were derived using Gama and Nguyen’s general estimates for the best obtainable
Hermite factor, and as such do not include concrete security estimates (e.g., of symmetric
bit security), nor do they incorporate specific information about q-ary lattices or post-
reduction decoding. Their parameters also apply to a less efficient LWE-based encryption
scheme that has larger keys than the one we describe and analyze.
4
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Lattices in Cryptography
In this chapter we will introduce some basic mathematical definitions and properties re-
lated to lattices. Our explanations aim to be sound and sufficient to make the rest of this
work accessible. For a complete and thorough introduction we recommend the surveys
[Ngu09, MR09, BLRS09, MG02].
2.1 Basics
Before we to start with lattices, let us first make some remarks about notation. We will
use boldface letters for matrices and vectors and normal other typefaces for their entries.
Geometrically, a lattice is a set of regularly recurring points in real vector space. This
geometric perspective is especially useful for visualizing computational problems in lattices.
On the other hand, algebraically, lattices are free Z-modules in real vector space. This
second perspective is also useful, since most algorithms and results are not tied to the
real vector space, but apply to free Z-modules in general. We use the following formal
definition.
Definition 2.1.1 (Lattice). Let L be a discrete, additive subgroup of Rm, then it is
a lattice and the maximum number of linearly independent vectors in L is the lattice
dimension or rank.
So, except for L = {0}, lattices are (countably) infinite point sets and as such hard to
work with. Fortunately, lattices can be described compactly.
Theorem 2.1.2. Let L be a subset of Rm, then these are equivalent:
• L is an n-dimensional lattice.
• There exist linearly independent vectors b1, . . . ,bn ∈ Rm, such that
L = b1Z+ · · ·+ bnZ.
For the interested reader, the proof is given in [Ngu09]. This theorem motivates the
following definition.
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Definition 2.1.3 (Lattice basis). A matrix B = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Rm×n with linearly inde-
pendent columnvectors is a basis of the lattice L(B) = b1Z+ · · ·+ bnZ.
We use the indefinite article on purpose here, since lattice bases are not necessarily
unique. In fact, the 0-dimensional lattice has exactly one basis, any 1-dimensional lattice
has exactly 2, and n-dimensional lattices with n > 1 have a (countably) infinite number
of bases. More precisely, given any particular basis B of an n-dimensional lattice L, all
bases of L are in the orbit of B under the general linear group GL(n,Z), i.e., the group
of n× n matrices that are invertible over the integers.
So, for any two bases B,B′ of the same lattice L there exists a unique transformation
matrix T, which is invertible over the integers, such that BT = B′, and conversely,
multiplying B with any transformation matrix T, which is invertible over the integers,
will yield another basis of the same lattice. This process is called basis transformation.
Definition 2.1.4 (Determinant). Given a basis B of the lattice L, we define the lattice
determinant to be
det(L) =
√
det(BTB).
Note that this definition is sound, since the lattice determinant, as defined here, remains
invariant under basis transformations.
In cryptography, we will often work with integral lattices of full rank, i.e., m-dimensional
sublattices of Zm. For these, there is one particular basis of special interest. It can be
computed efficiently from any given lattice basis using an integer variant of Gaussian
elimination.
Definition 2.1.5 (HNF). An integer matrix B ∈ Zm×m is in Hermite normal form if
(i) B is upper triangular,
(ii) bi,i > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and
(iii) 0 ≤ bi,j < bi,i, for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m.
Each integral lattice of full rank has exactly one basis in HNF. Using this particular
basis to describe the lattice is often convenient in practice. Since an HNF basis is upper
triangular, it will potentially require fewer description bits than other bases.
Every lattice has an associated dual lattice defined as follows.
Definition 2.1.6 (Dual). Let L be a lattice in Rm, then its dual lattice is
L∗ = {v ∈ Rm | ∀w ∈ L : vTw ∈ Z}.
Note that the dual lattice of an integral lattice is not necessarily integral, for example
(2Zn)∗ = (1/2)Zn. If a lattice with basis B has full rank, then (B−1)T is a basis of its
dual lattice.
2.2 Computational Problems
Having learned the basic properties of lattices, we will continue by listing the most relevant
computationally hard lattice problems. For a more comprehensive list, we refer to [MG02].
Computational problems for lattices are closely intertwined with the notion of “length”
we choose on the real vectorspace.
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Definition 2.2.1 (`p-Norm). Let p ∈ N ∪ {∞}, then the `p-norm is given by
‖·‖p : Rm −→ R : (v1, . . . , vm)T 7−→
{
(|v1|p + · · ·+ |vm|p)1/p for p <∞,
max{|v1|, . . . , |vm|} otherwise.
Current research is limited to the named cases, i.e., p = 1 (Manhatten norm), p = 2
(Euclidean norm), or p =∞ (Max norm). Having chosen an appropriate notion of length,
we can define another lattice invariante, namely the successive minima.
Definition 2.2.2 (Successive Minima). Let p ∈ N ∪ {∞} and L be an n-dimensional
lattice. For i = 1, . . . , n, the i-th successive minimum with respect to this norm is
λpi = min
{
r > 0 | ∃ linearly independent b1, . . . ,bi ∈ L : ‖bj‖p ≤ r for j = 1, . . . , i
}
.
So, the i-th successive minimum is the smallest radius of a ball containing i linearly
independent lattice vectors. Specifically, λp1(L) is the length of the shortest nonzero lattice
vector. The superscript p is usually omitted when the Euclidean norm (p = 2) is used.
We begin with the two oldest and most famous lattice problems.
Definition 2.2.3 (SVP). Given a lattice L and a real γ > 0, the shortest vector problem
SVPpγ is to find a nonzero lattice vector v ∈ L \ {0} such that ‖v‖p ≤ γλ1(L).
Definition 2.2.4 (CVP). Given a lattice L, a target vector t ∈ Rm, and a real γ > 0, the
closest vector problem CVPpγ is to find a lattice vector v ∈ L such that ‖t− v‖p ≤ γλ1(L).
By convention, if γ = 1 then the subscript is omitted and if p = 2 the superscript is
omitted. So for example, solving SVP means finding a shortest nonzero lattice vector in
the Euclidean norm.
As stated, these problems are known as search problems. Their solver is required to
present a mathematical object, in this case a vector, as opposed to a Yes/No decision.
We continue by stating related promise problems that have the latter form.
Definition 2.2.5 (GapSVP). Given a tuple (B, d), where B ∈ Qm×n is a basis and d ∈ Q
is some number, the gap shortest vector problem GapSVPpγ is to answer
Yes if λp1(L(B)) ≤ d, and No if λp1(L(B)) > γd.
Definition 2.2.6 (GapCVP). Given a tuple (B, t, d), where B ∈ Qm×n is a basis, t ∈ Qm
a target, and d ∈ Q is some number, the gap closest vector problem GapCVPpγ is to answer
Yes if ‖t− L‖p ≤ d, and No if ‖t− L‖p > γd,
where we use the shorthand ‖t− L‖p = min{‖t− v‖p | v ∈ L}.
Note that in either case we can set d to some fixed value, say d = 1, and scale B and t ac-
cordingly. Also, if a solver for GapSVPpγ is run on a tuple (B, d) where d < λ
p
1(L(B)) ≤ γd,
i.e., the promise inherent in the question is broken, then the solver’s behavior is impossible
to predict (it may not ever terminate). The same holds for GapCVP.
Since these problems ask for a decision, they fall into the realm of classic complexity
classes, such as P,NP,AM, . . ., adapted to the setting of promise problems. We state two
main results in this area and refer to a recent survey by Regev for more details [Reg09].
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Theorem 2.2.7 ([MG02]). For γ < p
√
2, GapSVPpγ is NP-hard under randomized reduc-
tions.
Theorem 2.2.8 ([AR04]). There exists c > 0 such that GapSVPc
√
n is in NP ∩ coNP.
So for small approximation factors γ <
√
2, the problem is NP-hard and for bigger
factors, starting around γ =
√
n, the problem is unlikely to be NP-hard. Similar results
hold for GapCVP.
2.3 Hard Instances
Having established that SVPγ is a hard problem, at least for small approximation factors
γ, we come to the very heart of lattice-based cryptography, namely the seminal results
by Ajtai [Ajt96a] and Regev [Reg05a] relating GapSVP and the average-case problems SIS
and LWE. We will see that hard instances of SVP and CVP may be found in the following
class of lattices.
Definition 2.3.1 (q-ary Lattices). A lattice L satisfying qZm ⊆ L ⊆ Zm is q-ary.
Given positive integers n, q,m and a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , we can define two q-ary lattices:
Λq(A) = {x ∈ Zm | x = Aty mod q for some y ∈ Zn },
Λ⊥q (A) = {x ∈ Zm | Ax = 0 mod q}.
Note that for a fixed matrix A, one is the scaled dual of the other, i.e., q(Λq(A))
∗ = Λ⊥q (A).
At the same time either form exists for all q-ary lattices.
Lemma 2.3.2 ([Mic10]). For any q-ary lattice L, there exist matrices A,A′ such that
L = Λq(A) = Λ⊥q (A′).
These lattices play a special role in lattice-based cryptography, because they appear
implicitly in the average-case problems SIS and LWE.
Definition 2.3.3 (SIS). In the small integer solution problem SIS(n, q,m, β), we are given
a matrix A ∼ U(Zn×mq ) chosen uniformly at random and a real β > 0. The task is to find
a nonzero integer vector x ∈ Zm \ {0} such that Ax ≡ 0 (mod q) and ‖x‖ ≤ β.
For very small β the problem is insolvable, since there need not be a solution vector that
is small enough. However, if β ≥ √m qn/m we know that a valid solution vector exists by
the pigeonhole principle.
Note that solving SIS with a random matrix A amounts to solving SVP in the q-ary
lattice Λ⊥q (A). In [BLR08], the connection of SIS and concrete lattice problems is further
explored and the progress of practical algorithms solving SIS is measured in the from of a
public contest, the lattice challenge1, which is open for all enthusiasts.
For the connection to worst-case problems, instead of restating Ajtai’s original result,
we give a recent result by Micciancio and Regev that offers the tightest connection known
today.
1See http://www.latticechallenge.org.
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Theorem 2.3.4 ([MR04]). For any m = Θ(n log(n)), there exist q = O(n2.5 log(n)), and
γ = O(n
√
log(n)), such that solving SIS(n, q,m, β) with β =
√
m qn/m is at least as hard
as solving GapSVPγ for all lattices of dimension n.
So, for large enough n with q,m, β chosen as suggested in the theorem, we expect SIS
to be a computationally hard problem.
Definition 2.3.5 (LWE). Let n, q,m be positive integers and χ be some distribution on Zq.
In the learning with errors problem LWE(n, q,m, χ), we are given a matrix A ∼ U(Zn×mq )
chosen uniformly at random and a vector t ∈ Zmq , such that either
(i) t ∼ U(Zmq ), or
(ii) t = Ats + e for some s ∼ U(Znq ), and e ∼ χm.
In the decision variant, the task is to distinguish between these distributions for t. In the
search variant, we are always in the second case and the goal is to recover s or e.
This problem is sometimes stated without the parameter m. In this case we are given
an arbitrary number of coordinates of t.
Similar to SIS, solving search-LWE with a random matrix A amounts to solving CVP in
the q-ary lattice Λq(A).
For the best worst-case connection, we will need to specify a special distribution taking
the place of χ. For any positive real α, we let Ψ¯α denote the distribution on Zq obtained
by sampling a random variable with mean 0 and standard deviation αq/
√
2pi, rounding
the result to the nearest integer and reducing it modulo q. We are usually interested in
the case where χ = Ψ¯α. For this we will write LWE(n, q,m, α).
Theorem 2.3.6 ([Reg05a]). Assume there is an oracle which solves the decision variant
of LWE(n, q,m, α), where αq >
√
n, furthermore q ≤ poly(n) is prime, and m ≤ poly(n).
Then there exists a quantum algorithm running in time poly(n) for solving GapSVPO˜(n/α)
in all lattices of dimension n.
The worst-case to average-case reductions for SIS and LWE also hold within a subclass of
lattices, namely lattices corresponding to ideals in the ring Z[ζ], where ζ is some algebraic
integer that is fixed for the reduction [LM06, LPR10]. These reductions use different
methodologies and are more recent than the general ones we have described up to now.
All involved problems usually get the prefix “Ideal” or just ‘I’ to clarify the restriction to
such lattices.
The additional ring structure of ideal lattices allows all cryptographic schemes which
use them to sport smaller keys and, for a slightly more restricted class, be much more
efficient as well. In each case, the change in keysizes and trapdoor evaluation time is from
O˜(n2) for general lattices to O˜(n) for ideal lattices. For details on such constructions, we
refer to Lyubashevsky’s PhD thesis [Lyu08b].
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Density of Ideal Lattices
In this chapter, we will show that for a fixed maximal order OK , the set of ideal lattices
with respect to ideals in OK that have bounded determinant, due to its inherent structure,
forms a comparatively small subset of all lattices under the same bound.
The security of many efficient cryptographic constructions, e.g., collision-resistant hash
functions, digital signatures, identification schemes, and more recently public-key encryp-
tion, has been proven assuming the hardness of worst-case computational problems in
ideal lattices. These lattices correspond to ideals in the ring Z[ζ], where ζ is some fixed
algebraic integer.
Under the assumption that this ring Z[ζ] is the maximal order of the number field Q(ζ),
we show that the density of n-dimensional ideal lattices with determinant ≤ b among all
lattices under the same bound is in O(b1−n) as b grows. So, for lattices of dimension > 1
with bounded determinant, the subclass of ideal lattices is always vanishingly small. Our
assumption, though not valid for all algebraic integers ζ, is certainly valid for all ζ that
have been suggested for practical use.
Though interesting from a theoretical point of view, we advise the reader that there
is no known algorithm solving standard computational lattice problems, such as SVP or
CVP, that can use this special structure to noticeably decrease the time required to solve
the problem.
This chapter is based on [BL09a]. It was presented both at the Algorithms and Number
Theory Seminar 2009 in Dagstuhl, Germany and the Western European Workshop on
Research in Cryptology (WEWoRC) 2009 in Graz, Austria.
3.1 Introduction
Following the seminal result of Ajtai from 1996, which gives a worst-case to average-case re-
duction for computational problems in lattices [Ajt96a], the security of many lattice-based
cryptographic schemes was proven assuming the hardness of these worst-case problems,
e.g., [GGH96, LM08, GPV08, Pei09].
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Using similar methods, Lyubashevsky and Micciancio found in 2006 that the same
worst-case to average-case reduction holds for a different class of lattices, namely lattices
corresponding to ideals in the ring Z[ζ], where ζ is some algebraic integer that is fixed for
the reduction. The additional structure of these lattices allows the cryptographic schemes
which use them to be much more efficient and require smaller keys. In each case, the
change for keysizes and trapdoor evaluation time is from O˜(n2) for general lattices to O˜(n)
for ideal lattices. Again, many cryptographic schemes were proven secure assuming the
hardness of worst-case problems in ideal lattices, see [LM06, LM08, LMPR08, SSTX09].
Until today, there has been no in-depth analysis of the hardness relationship of these
two worst-case problems which have become the basis of security for so many schemes,
although it is folklore that problems in ideal lattices are easier and it is known that
the property of being an ideal can be efficiently recognized in any lattice basis [DL07].
We give a first solid indication that worst-case computational problems in ideal lattices
are potentially much simpler. We show that the number of n-dimensional lattices with
bounded determinant ≤ b is Ω(bn) as b goes to infinity. The number of ideal lattices under
the same constraints is only O(b), a vanishingly small quantity in comparison.
3.2 Algebraic Number Theory
We start with a special subring of the complex numbers. The ring of algebraic integers is
A = {ζ ∈ C | ∃f ∈ Z[x] : f monic and f(ζ) = 0}.
Throughout this chapter, let ζ ∈ A be an algebraic integer, and K = Q(ζ) be a number
field of degree deg(K) = [K : Q] = n.
Definition 3.2.1. An order O is a subring of A that is a free Z-module.
The integral combinations of powers of ζ form an order Z[ζ] = [1, ζ, . . . , ζn−1]Zn. An-
other order, the ring of integers in K, is
OK = A ∩K.
This order is maximal in the sense that it contains all other orders in K. Note that the
rank of an order in K, as a Z-module, cannot exceed the extension degree of K. So, there
exist β1, . . . , βn ∈ OK such that OK = [β1, . . . , βn]Zn.
We can embed K into Qn via the coefficients
σ : K −→ Qn : a0 + a1ζ + · · ·+ an−1ζn−1 7−→ (a0, a1, . . . , an−1)T = a.
Definition 3.2.2. Let O be an order in K. An O-ideal lattice is a lattice L ⊆ Zn such
that L = σ(i) for some ideal i ⊆ O.
In the special case O = Z[ζ], this matches the definition of Lyubashevsky and Micciancio
in [LM06].
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We will often use the embedding σ implicitly and write, for example, det(i) instead of
det(σ(i)). The norm of an ideal i in O is N(i) = |O / i|. This is related to the determinant
of the corresponding ideal lattice
N(i) = det(i) · det(O). (3.2.1)
For the case O = OK , this is the field norm.
Conforming with notations in related works, we will use greek letters for elements of K
and fraktur for (fractional) ideals of OK .
3.3 Counting Lattices
General lattices. For integers n, b > 0, let all n-dimensional full-rank integral lattices
with determinant ≤ b be
Ln(b) = {L ⊆ Zn : dim(L) = n, det(L) ≤ b}
and let their number be ln(b) = |Ln(b)|.
In 1968 Schmidt showed in [Sch68] that as b goes to infinity, we have ln(b) ∈ O(bn). We
will use a similar methodology to derive a lower bound.
Theorem 3.3.1. For integers n, b > 0, we have ln(b) ≥ bn/n.
Proof. Let L′n(d) = {L ⊆ Zn : det(L) = d}, l′n(d) = |L′n(d)|. We start by showing
l′n(1) = l
′
1(d) = 1, (3.3.1)
l′n(d) =
∑
c|d
cn−1 l′n−1(d/c). (3.3.2)
It suffices to count the number of possible lattice bases in HNF, because this form is unique
for each lattice. Equations 3.3.1 are an immediate consequence.
Now, let L ∈ L′n(d), B = HNF(L), and c = bn,n. Consider the last row of B. We
know c | d and 0 ≤ bn,i < c for i = 1, . . . , n − 1. These are
∑
c|d c
n−1 possible rows. The
remaining upper left (n− 1)× (n− 1) submatrix of B could be the HNF of any lattice in
L′n−1(d/c), which shows Equation 3.3.2.
We can now prove the claim
ln(b) =
b∑
d=1
l′n(d) =
b∑
d=1
∑
c|d
cn−1l′n−1(d/c) ≥
b∑
d=1
dn−1 ≥
∫ b
0
dn−1 dd ≥ bn/n.
Note that, during the proof, we counted lattices whose HNF differs from the iden-
tity matrix only in the last row and we found there are at least Ω(bn) many of those.
Since Schmidt showed in [Sch68] that O(bn) is also an upper bound on the number of
n-dimensional lattices with determinant ≤ b, it follows that lattices with these special
bases are a dense subset of all lattices. This was shown less elementarily by Goldstein and
Mayer [DG03].
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Ideal lattices. For integers n, b > 0, let O be an order of rank n in K. Furthermore, let
the set of all O-ideal lattices with determinant ≤ b be
IOn (b) = {L ⊆ Zn : L is O-ideal lattice, dim(L) = n,det(L) ≤ b}
and let their number be iOn (b) = |IOn (b)|. We adapt an old result of Dedekind and Weber,
which was recently made more precise by Murty and Van Order [MVO07].
Theorem 3.3.2. Let K be a number field of degree n, then for integers b > 0 we have
iOKn (b) ≤ hK(2cKb1/n + 1)n/(w det(OK)),
where hK is the number of ideal classes, w is the number of roots of unity in K, and cK
is another real constant depending only on K.
Proof. Let C be some ideal class in OK ,
ICn(b) = {a ∈ C : 0 < N(a) ≤ b}, iCn(b) = |ICn(b)|.
We start by showing for any ideal b ∈ C−1, iCn(b) = |bICn(b)|. Obviously, ≥ holds and we
also have |bICn(b)| ≥ |(b−1)bICn(b)| = |ICn(b)|, which gives us ≤. Note that
bICn(b) = {〈α〉 ⊆ b : 0 < N(α) ≤ bN(b)},
so in order to count ideals in C it suffices to count principal ideals in b.
The span of two elements is equal if and only if they differ by a ring unit: 〈α〉 = 〈α′〉 ⇐⇒
there exists a unit  ∈ OK such that α′ = α.
Let (r1, r2) be the signature of K and r = r1 + r2 − 1. Dirichlet proved the following
classification (see, e.g., [ME05, p. 99]): There exist fundamental units 1, . . . , r ∈ OK
such that  is a unit in OK if and only if  = ζn11 · · · nrr , where ζ ∈ K is a root of unity,
and n1, . . . , nr ∈ Z. Recall that the total number of roots of unity in K is w.
We continue by showing that for each principal ideal 〈α〉 ∈ bICn(b) there exist w many
reals 0 ≤ c1, . . . , cr < 1 such that
r∑
j=1
cj log |(i)j | = log(|α(i)|N(α)−1/n) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (3.3.3)
Note that the r× r matrix (log |(i)j |)1≤i,j≤r is non-singular, so for each α ∈ b there exist
(unrestricted) reals c1, . . . , cr such that Equation 3.3.3 holds for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Let α′ = α
for some unit , then we have
log
(
|α′(i)|N(α′)−1/n
)
=
r∑
j=1
nj log |(i)j |+ log
(
|α(i)|N(α)−1/n
)
=
r∑
j=1
(nj + cj) log |(i)j |.
So, by Dirichlet’s classification, restricting the reals to 0 ≤ c1, . . . , cr < 1 leaves only w
many for each principal ideal. For the rest, fix any of the w many.
For r + 1 < i ≤ n, we have |(·)(i)| = |(·)(i−r2)| = |(·)(i−r2)|, so Equation 3.3.3 holds for
these.
14
3.3 Counting Lattices
Since N(α) =
∏n
i=1 |α(i)| and 1 = N(j) =
∏n
i=1 |(i)j | for 1 ≤ j ≤ r, we get
n∑
i=1
r∑
j=1
cj log |(i)j | =
r∑
j=1
cj
(
n∑
i=1
log |(i)j |
)
= 0 =
n∑
i=1
log
(
|α(i)|N(α)−1/n
)
.
We already knew that the summands of the left- and rightmost sum are equal for i 6= r+1,
so this equality gives us the final case i = r + 1 for Equation 3.3.3.
Finally, we prove the theorem. Let hK be the number of ideal classes,
iOKn (b) ≤ hK maxC {i
C
n(b)}/ det(OK).
Let β1, . . . , βn be an integral basis of OK . For each principal ideal in bICn(b), there are
w many α subject to Equation 3.3.3. For each of these α, there exist unique integers
x1, . . . , xn such that α = x1β1 + · · ·xnβn. We will show that the total number of these
integers and thus iCn(b) is bounded.
The β1, . . . , βn form a basis, so the matrix B = (β
(i)
j )1≤i,j≤n is invertible and
‖(xi)1≤i≤n‖∞ ≤ ‖B−1‖∞ ‖(α(i))1≤i≤n‖∞.
Let m = max{log |(i)j | : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ r}. By Equation 3.3.3 we know
‖(α(i))1≤i≤n‖∞ ≤ exp(rm)|N(α)1/n| ≤ exp(rm)(bN(b))1/n.
Minkowski showed that an ideal b in class C−1 can always be chosen such that
N(b) ≤ (4/pi)r2n!
√
|dK |/nn,
where dK is the discriminant of K (see, e.g., [Ash10, Ch. 5]). Altogether, we have
‖(xi)1≤i≤n‖∞ ≤ (4/pi)r2/n‖B−1‖∞ exp(rm)(n!
√
|dK |/nn)1/n︸ ︷︷ ︸
=cK
·b1/n.
Since all possible x1, . . . , xn are bounded in this way, the total number of α subject to
Equation 3.3.3 is (2cK + 1)
n. As we know there exist at most w many of these α for every
principal ideal in bICn(b), we get
iCn(b) ≤ (2cKb1/n + 1)n/w,
which completes the proof.
Now, we can derive the claimed density statements from this theorem and theorem 3.3.1.
Corollary 3.3.3. For integers n, b > 0, as b→∞ we have
iOKn (b)/ln(b) ∈ O(b1−n).
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For all non-trivial dimensions the density ratio goes to zero. Though the density state-
ment we derived is asymptotic, the theorems we have presented contain all the necessary
constants to make it explicit. In practical experiments, we observed that for dimensions
≥ 100 the amount of bounded OK-ideal lattices is vanishingly small compared to all lat-
tices under the same bound.
This tells us that whenever the maximal order OK of some number field K = Q(ζ)
coincides with the order Z[ζ], the number of ideal lattices with respect to this ring, which
are exactly the ones used in worst-case hardness assumptions, is vanishingly small among
all lattices (given the same bound on the determinant).
In practice, the only rings that have been used and suggested for constructing ideal
lattices are maximal orders of cyclotomic number fields. This is because these fields allow
an especially efficient multiplication due to the Fast Fourier Transform.
3.4 General Orders
In the previous section we have shown that the number of lattices with bounded determi-
nant corresponding to ideals in the maximal order of a number field is small compared to
the total number of lattices with the same bound on the determinant.
For all cyclotomic fields (and a lot more), it is certainly true that Z[ζ] is the maximal
order and our result stands. However, we may ask ourselves what happens to our counting
argument if we use other (non-maximal) orders to construct our ideal lattices.
We will give a partial answer to this question here. We will use an old result of Dedekind
and the result of last section to show that the number of bounded ideals coprime to the
conductor is small. This leaves open the problem of counting the number of bounded
ideals not coprime to the conductor.
Definition 3.4.1 (Conductor). Given any order O ⊆ K, we define its conductor to be
c = {α ∈ K : αOK ⊆ O }.
Note that c is the largest ideal of O that is also an ideal of OK .
Definition 3.4.2. Let O ⊆ K be an order. We say that two ideals a, b ⊆ O are coprime
if and only if a + b = O.
With all the definitions in place, we can formulate Dedekind’s result (e.g., [Lan73,
pp. 92,94]).
Theorem 3.4.3. Let O ⊆ K be any order with conductor c. Then the two monoids
A = { a ⊆ O ideal : a + c = O}, B = { b ⊆ OK ideal : b + c = OK }
are isomorphic via the mapping
φ : A −→ B : a 7−→ aOK , φ−1 : B −→ A : b 7−→ b ∩ O.
This theorem implies the claims we made earlier. It shows that ideals in O coprime to
the conductor correspond 1-to-1 to ideals in OK . So there can never be more ideals in O
coprime to the conductor than there are ideals OK in total. By the argument given in
Corollary 3.3.3, the number of the related O-ideal lattices is vanishingly small.
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Lattice-Based Compression Functions
In this chapter, we will discuss the SWIFFT compression functions, proposed by Lyuba-
shevsky et al. at FSE 2008. They are very efficient instantiations of generalized compact
knapsacks for a specific set of parameters. In particular, they have the property that,
asymptotically, finding collisions for a randomly chosen compression function implies be-
ing able to solve computationally hard ideal lattice problems in the worst-case.
We will present three results. First, we present new average-case problems, which may
be used for all lattice schemes whose security is based on SIS either with general or ideal
lattices. The new average-case problems require less description bits, resulting in improved
keysize and speed for these schemes. Second, we propose a parameter generation algorithm
for SWIFFT, where the main parameter n can be any integer in the image of Euler’s totient
function, and not necessarily a power of 2 as before. Third, we give experimental evidence
that finding `2-pseudo-collisions
1 for SWIFFT is as hard as breaking a 68-bit symmetric
cipher according to the well-known heuristic by Lenstra and Verheul. We also recommend
conservative parameters corresponding to a 127-bit symmetric cipher.
This chapter is based on [BL09b]. It was presented at the 10th International Conference
on Cryptology in India (Indocrypt) 2009 in New Delhi, India.
4.1 Introduction
Collision-resistant hash functions play a key role in the IT world. They are an important
part of digital signatures as well as authentication protocols.
Despite their fundamental importance, several established hash function designs have
turned out to be insecure, for example MD5 and SHA-1 [SLdW07, CMR07]. To avoid
this lack of security in a central place for the future, we need efficient hash functions with
strong security guarantees.
One such hash function with an intriguing design is SWIFFTX [ADL+08]. In contrast to
1These `2-pseudo-collisions are not related to the usual pseudo-collisions as defined in, e.g., the Handbook
of Applied Cryptography [MvOV01].
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all other practical hash functions, including all SHA-3 candidates, it remains the only hash
function where the most prominent security property, namely collision-resistance, relies
solely on the hardness of a well studied mathematical problem. This guarantee on the
collision-resistance of SWIFFTX is a feature derived directly from SWIFFT [LMPR08],
the internal compression function, which has the same guarantee.
SWIFFTX was part of a hash design competition by the National Institute for Standards
and Technology (NIST). It did not survive the competition, and we suspect this is due to
inefficiency, with the main bottleneck being SWIFFT.
This chapter has three contributions. First, we present new compact average-case
problems that require less description bits than the ones previously used. These are
shown to be at least as hard as previous ones. To demonstrate the improvement, we
then show how the new problems can be used to create more efficient SWIFFT in-
stances. This improvement to space and time requirements applies not only to SWIFFT,
but universally to all lattice-schemes based on worst-case problems via Ajtai’s reduction
(e.g., [GGH96, GPV08, LMPR08, LM08, XT08]).
Second, we present a parameter generation algorithm that produces parameters sets,
where the main parameter may be any number in the image of Euler’s totient function
and not just a power of 2 as before. We show that all efficiency improvements that were
proposed for the standard SWIFFT parameters also apply to an exemplary parameter set
from our generator. These parameters are later shown to be far more secure than the
standard SWIFFT parameters.
Third, we show that SWIFFT is subject to lattice basis reduction attacks in dimensions
that are far smaller than the ones the authors claim are necessary. We give evidence that
finding `2-pseudo-collisions takes an effort comparable to breaking a 68-bit symmetric
cipher, i.e., it is considered feasible today. Such pseudo-collisions are closely related to
actual collisions and being able to recover them should be infeasible for high security
applications. We give alternative parameters which realize.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the new average-case prob-
lems and reductions from SIS respective IdealSIS. Section 4.3 describes the SWIFFT
compression function family and the SWIFFT lattice. Section 4.4 presents the parameter
generation algorithm and Section 4.5 discusses SWIFFT’s security.
4.2 Compact (Ideal)SIS
In this section we present a new average-case problem SIS′. We show that the average-case
small integer solution problem (SIS) reduces to SIS′. Hence, SIS′ can be used, for example,
to solve worst-case problems that reduce to SIS without any loss in the parameters. The
advantage is that SIS′ requires n2 log(q) less random bits. A similar construction is possible
for the average-case problem LWE and has indeed been suggested (without naming it or
proving reductions) by Regev and Micciancio in [MR09].
All cryptographic schemes whose security relies on SIS can switch to SIS′, resulting in a
scheme with smaller keys which is also slightly faster (due to the structure of SIS′). This
includes all systems based on worst-case lattice problems via Ajtai’s reduction [Ajt96a] or
the adaptions thereof (e.g., [GGH96, GPV08]).
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We will also show that the same idea can be adapted to the IdealSIS problem, which
is SIS restricted to the class of ideal lattices. The number of description bits we save in
this case is n log(q). Hence, all schemes based on worst-case problems in ideal lattices
via the reduction of Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [LM08] can benefit from using IdealSIS′
(e.g., [LMPR08, LM08, XT08, SSTX09]). How these improvements apply to SWIFFT
may be seen in Section 4.3.
The technical difference is that SIS chooses a somewhat random basis for a random
lattice, whereas SIS′ chooses only a random lattice and takes the basis in Hermite normal
form. This is analogous to using the standard (or systematic) form for linear codes in
coding theory.
To illustrate the difference between the two problems we restate the definition of SIS as
seen in Chapter 2 and give the definition of SIS′.
Definition 4.2.1 (SIS). In the small integer solution problem SIS(n, q,m, β), we are given
a matrix A ∼ U(Zn×mq ) chosen uniformly at random and a real β > 0. The task is to find
a nonzero integer vector x ∈ Zm \ {0} such that Ax ≡ 0 (mod q) and ‖x‖ ≤ β.
In contrast, the distribution for A used in SIS′ is different.
Definition 4.2.2 (SIS′). In the compact small integer solution problem SIS′(n, q,m, β),
we are given a matrix A′ ∼ U(Zn×(m−n)q ) chosen uniformly at random and a real β > 0.
The task is to find a nonzero integer vector x ∈ Zm \ {0} such that [In,A′]x ≡ 0 (mod q)
and ‖x‖ ≤ β. Here, In is the n-dimensional identity matrix.
This problem corresponds to the previous one, but with A = [In,A
′], so it requires
n2 log(q) less descriptions bits. We show that new problem is as hard as the old one.
Theorem 4.2.3. Let n, q(n) ≥ 2, m(n) ≥ (1 + )n be positive integers, and β(n) > 0
be a positive real, then SIS(n, q(n),m(n), β(n)) reduces to SIS′(n, q(n),m(n), β(n)). Here,
 > 0 is some real number independent of n.
Proof. Given A, an instance of SIS(n, q(n),m(n), β(n)), let E be the event that there are
n column vectors in A which are linearly independent mod q(n). For brevity, we will write
q, m, β instead of q(n), m(n), β(n).
Assuming E holds, there is a permutation matrix P ∈ {0, 1}m×m such that AP =
[A′,A′′] and A′ is invertible mod q. We use the SIS′ oracle to solve (q, [In,A′−1A′′], β).
This instance is distributed according to SIS′, when the matrix A′−1A′′ is distributed
according to U(Zn×(m−n)q ). This is the case, since A′′ was distributed this way and A′−1
is invertible mod q, so it is a permutation on the vectors Znq which does not affect the
uniform distribution. From the SIS′ oracle, we obtain a solution z. The vector Pz solves
our SIS instance because
0 = [In,A
′−1A′′]z = [A′,A′′]z = APz (mod q).
We will show that the probability of E not occurring is negligible. The number of
matrices A with n linearly independent columns is equal to the number of matrices with
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n linearly independent rows. For E to occur, the first row may be anything but the zero-
row, giving (qm − 1) possibilities; the second row can be all but multiples of the first,
giving (qm − q) possibilities, and so on. The total number of matrices is qnm, so we get
Pr[not E] = 1− q−nm
n−1∏
i=0
(qm − qi) = 1−
n−1∏
i=0
(1− qi−m).
Let c = −2 ln(1/2), we bound the probability
1−
n−1∏
i=0
(1− qi−m) = 1− exp
(
(−1)2 ln
( n−1∏
i=0
(1− qi−m)
))
(1)
≤
n−1∑
i=0
− ln(1− qi−m)
(2)
≤ c q−m
n−1∑
i=0
qi
= c(qn − 1)/(qm(q − 1)) ≤ c/qm−n
(3)
≤ c/2n.
Inequality (1) holds because for all real x we have 1− exp(−x) ≤ x. Similarly, inequality
(2) holds because for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2 we have − ln(1 − x) ≤ cx. Finally, inequality (3)
follows from the conditions stated in the theorem. The resulting function is negligible,
which completes the proof.
In the remainder of the section we will adapt Theorem 4.2.3 to the case of ideal lat-
tices. Throughout this part, let ζn be a sequence of algebraic integers such that the
ring Rn = Z[ζn] is a Z-module of rank n, i.e., Rn ∼= Zn as an additive group. Since
Rn = [1, ζn, . . . , ζ
n−1
n ]Zn, we can use any norm on ring elements by transforming them to
integral coefficient vectors of this power basis. In order to apply norms on tuples of ring
elements, we take the norm of the vector consisting of the norms of each element, so for
ẑ ∈ Rmn we have ‖ẑ‖ = ‖(‖z1‖, . . . , ‖zm‖)‖. We use the shorthand Rn,q = Rn/〈q〉 = Zq[ζn].
Definition 4.2.4 (IdealSIS). Given integers n, m, q, a tuple â = [a1, . . . ,am] ∈ Rmn,q, and
a real β, the ideal shortest vector problem IdealSIS(n, q,m, β) is to find a nonzero vector
ẑ = [z1, . . . , zm] ∈ Rmn \ {0}, such that
m∑
i=1
ai zi = 0 and ‖ẑ‖ ≤ β.
Analogous to the case of general lattices, the compact problem is:
Definition 4.2.5 (IdealSIS′). Given integers n, m, q, a tuple â′ = [a1, . . . ,am−1] ∈ Rmn,q,
and a real β, the compact ideal shortest vector problem IdealSIS′(n, q,m, β) is to find a
nonzero vector ẑ = [z1, . . . , zm] ∈ Rmn \ {0}, such that
z1 +
m−1∑
i=1
ai zi+1 = 0 and ‖ẑ‖ ≤ β.
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Again this problem corresponds to the previous one with â = [1, â′]. In this case we
save n log(q) description bits and once more, we will show that the new problem is as hard
as the well known one.
Theorem 4.2.6. Let n, m(n) ∈ Ω(log(n)) be positive integers, q(n) ∈ ω(n) be prime, and
β(n) > 0 be real, then the corresponding IdealSIS reduces to IdealSIS′.
Proof. Given â, an instance of IdealSIS(n, q(n),m(n), β(n)), let E be the event that there
is an index i such that a′ = ai is invertible mod q(n). For brevity, we will write q, m, β
instead of q(n), m(n), β(n).
Assuming E holds, there is a permutation P ∈ {0, 1}m×m, such that âP = [a′, â′′] and
a′ is invertible mod q. We let the IdealSIS′ oracle solve the instance (q, [1,a′−1â′′], β).
This instance is distributed according to IdealSIS′, when the tuple a′−1â′′ is distributed
according to U(Rm−1n,q ). This is the case, since â′′ was distributed this way and a′−1 is
invertible mod q, so it is a permutation on the elements Rn,q which does not effect the
uniform distribution. From the IdealSIS′ oracle, we obtain a solution ẑ. The vector Pẑ
solves our IdealSIS instance:
0 =
[
1,a′−1â′′
]
ẑ =
[
a′, â′′
]
ẑ = âPẑ (mod q).
We will show that the probability of E not occurring is negligible. Let f be the minimal
polynomial of ζn, and f1, . . . , fk be the irreducible factors of f over Zq. Since q is prime,
for any invertible element a ∈ Rn,q, it is necessary and sufficient that a mod fi 6= 0. So,
the number of invertible elements is |R∗n,q| =
∏k
i=1(q
deg(fi) − 1). The total number of ring
elements is |Rn,q| = qn. For E to occur, only one of the m ring elements must be invertible,
so we get
Pr[not E] =
(
1− q−n
k∏
i=1
(
qdeg(fi) − 1
))m
=
(
1−
k∏
i=1
(
1− q−deg(fi)
))m
Let c = −2 ln(1/2), we bound (Pr[not E])1/m
1−
k∏
i=1
(
1− q−deg(fi)
) (1)
≤
k∑
i=1
− ln
(
1− q− deg(fi)
) (2)
≤ c
k∑
i=1
q− deg(fi)
= ck/q ≤ cn/q (3)∈ 1/ω(1).
Inequality (1) holds because for all real x we have 1− exp(−x) ≤ x. Similarly, inequality
(2) holds because for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2 we have − ln(1 − x) ≤ cx. Finally, (3) follows
from the conditions stated in the theorem. Since m(n) ∈ Ω(log(n)), we know Pr[not E] is
negligible.
4.3 SWIFFT Compression Functions
The SWIFFT compression function family was proposed by Lyubashevsky et al. at FSE
2008 [LMPR08]. They showed that its efficiency is comparable to SHA-2. It was al-
ready shown in 2006 by Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [LM06] that the collision resistance
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of generalized compact knapsacks, of which SWIFFT is one particular instantiation, is
asymptotically based on worst-case computational problems in ideal lattices. The argu-
ments given later in 2006 by Peikert and Rosen in [PR06] can also be adapted to prove
collision resistance of generalized compact knapsacks with a tighter connection to the same
worst-case problem.
Specifically, for a set of integer parameters (n,m, p), in the SWIFFT case (64, 16, 257),
they use the polynomial f(x) = xn + 1, the ring Rp,n = Zp[x]/〈f〉 and the subset
Dn = {d0 + d1x+ · · · dn−1xn−1 ∈ Rp,n : (di mod p) ∈ {0, 1} for i = 0, . . . , n− 1},
to define the family
Hn,m,p =
{
hâ : D
m
n 3 x̂ 7−→
m∑
i=1
aixi (mod p) : (a1, . . . ,am) = â ∈ Rmp,n
}
.
These functions can be computed efficiently. Let ω0, . . . , ωn−1 be the roots of f in Zp
in any order, and V be the Vandermonde matrix generated by them
V =
1 ω0 . . . ω
n−1
0
...
...
...
1 ωn−1 . . . ωn−1n−1
 .
Applying the Fast Fourier Transform over Zp to SWIFFT, we get
z ≡
m−1∑
i=0
aixi mod f ≡ V−1
(
m−1∑
i=0
Vai Vxi
)
(mod p), (4.3.1)
where  is the pointwise multiplication in Znp . Since V is invertible, we may use z′ = Vz
as hash, instead of z. Since the compression function key â is fixed, we may precompute
a′i = Vai for all i. So evaluating the compression function amounts to computing all n
components of z′ with
z′j =
m−1∑
i=0
a′i,j x
′
i,j mod p, x
′
i,j =
n−1∑
l=0
ωlj xi,l mod p.
Due to the form of f we can set ωj ← ω2j+1 for any element ω of order 2n in Zp. We
insert the parameters and split up the indices j = j0 + 8j1 and l = l0 + 8l1.
x′i,j0+8j1 =
7∑
l0=0
7∑
l1=0
ω(l0+8l1)(2(j0+8j1)+1) xi,l0+8l1 mod p
=
7∑
l0=0
ω16l0j1 · ωl0(2j0+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ml0,j0
·
7∑
l1=0
ω8l1(2j0+1) xi,l0+8l1︸ ︷︷ ︸
tl0,j0
modp (4.3.2)
22
4.3 SWIFFT Compression Functions
The quantities tl0,j0 for all 2
8 possible values of xi,l0+8l1 and ml0,j0 can be precomputed.
The SWIFFT authors recommend using ω = 42, because then ω16 mod p = 4, so some
multiplications in the last expression can be realized with bit-shifts. A single x′i, i.e., the
last expression for all j, can then be evaluated with a total of 64 multiplications and 8 · 24
additions/subtractions using an FFT network. The total number of operations (ignoring
index calculations and modular reduction) for the standard SWIFFT parameters is
16 · 64︸ ︷︷ ︸
computing x′i,j
+ 16 · 64︸ ︷︷ ︸
all a′i,j · x′i,j
= 2048 multiplications
16 · 8 · 24︸ ︷︷ ︸
computing x′i,j
+ 16 · 64− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
summing a′i,j · x′i,j
= 4095 additions/subtractions
Applying the ideas put forward in Section 4.2, we recommend using functions from
H′n,m,p =
{
hâ : D
m
n 3 x̂ 7−→ x1 +
m−1∑
i=1
aixi+1 (mod p) : (a1, . . . ,am−1) = â ∈ Rm−1p,n
}
.
This results in a slightly more efficient scheme which uses less memory. Recall that all
entries in â′ = (1,a1, . . . ,am−1) can be precomputed in practice and having one of them
equal to 1 saves some multiplications during evaluation depending on the implementation.
In Equation 4.3.1, if we computed z instead of z′ the speed-up would be 1/m. For m = 16
this is ≈ 6% and it may be further increased with the sliding window method used for
NTRU [BDL08]. However, at the moment it is more efficient to compute z′. In this
case, we save n multiplications, which is about 1% of all operations for standard SWIFFT
parameters.
4.3.1 The SWIFFT Lattice
Let â ∈ Rp,n. Consider the function hâ ∈ Hn,m,p and extend the domain to Rn = Z[x]/〈f〉.
The coefficient vectors of periods of this function form the set
Λ⊥p (â) =
{
(v1, . . . , vnm) ∈ Znm : hâ
(
n−1∑
i=0
vi+1x
i, . . . ,
n−1∑
i=0
vm(i+1)x
i
)
= 0
}
.
This is a lattice of dimension nm, since the extended hâ is Rn-linear. A basis for this
lattice can be found efficiently using a method described by Buchmann et al. in [BLR08].
Collisions in the original (unextended) function hâ correspond exactly to vectors in this
lattice with `∞-norm bounded by 1. Therefore we refer to these lattices as SWIFFT
lattices.
A pseudo-collision is a vector in this lattice with Euclidean norm less than
√
nm, i.e.,
all vectors in the smallest ball containing all collisions. So every collision corresponds to
a pseudo-collision, but not vice versa.
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4.4 Parameter Generation
In the previous section, we have seen that SWIFFT, as presented by the authors, has only
one set of parameters. In this section we will show that several sets may be used without
losing much in terms of efficiency.
Let k > 0 be some integer, p be prime and n = ϕ(k), where ϕ is Euler’s totient function.
Furthermore, let f be the k-th cyclotomic polynomial, i.e.,
f(x) =
∏
d|k
(1− xk/d)µ(d),with µ(d) =
{ (−1)` if d is a product of ` distinct primes
1 if d = 1
0 otherwise.
It’s known that this is always an integer polynomial. It is also monic, irreducible over the
integers, and has degree equal to n [Lan65]. Using the same structures as in the Section 4.3
with this new f , i.e., the ring Rp,n and subset Dn, we can construct the same compression
function family and the asymptotic security argument given in [PR06, LM06] still holds.
In order to apply FFT as before, we need to ensure that elements of order k exist in Zp.
This is guaranteed whenever k | (p− 1).
We now describe an algorithm for generating parameter sets (n,m, p). For the polyno-
mial f we will use the k-th cyclotomic polynomial such that n = ϕ(k). However, there are
cases where multiple polynomials are possible, for example, n = 256 = ϕ(257) = ϕ(512).
In these cases, we choose k such that the resulting bitlength of the output is shorter, i.e.,
the one with smaller p.
Input: Integer n, s.t. n = ϕ(k), k > 0
Output: Parameters (n,m, p)
l← 1
p← k + 1
while not isPrime(p) do
l← l + 1
p← l · k + 1
end
m← d1.99 · log2(p)e
Algorithm 1: Parameter generation for n = ϕ(k), k > 0.
To illustrate the differences between these parameters, we compute several additional
quantities for each set and list them in Figure 4.1.
For example, the output bitlength of the resulting compression function is given by
out = n(blog2(p)c+ 1) and its compression rate is cr = m/ log2(p). To indicate the col-
lision resistance of each parameter set, we state the Hermite factor δ that needs to be
achieved in order to find pseudo-collisions, and the minimal lattice dimension d where
we can expect to find such pseudo-collisions. The two latter values are computed in the
following fashion.
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k n m p out cr δ d
128 64 16 257 513 1.999 1.0084 206
67 66 17 269 529 2.106 1.0084 211
71 70 19 569 631 2.076 1.0073 248
73 72 17 293 577 2.074 1.0077 231
79 78 17 317 625 2.046 1.0072 251
83 82 15 167 575 2.032 1.0075 237
89 88 15 179 617 2.004 1.0071 255
97 96 18 389 769 2.092 1.0061 308
101 100 19 607 901 2.055 1.0056 340
103 102 19 619 919 2.049 1.0055 348
107 106 19 643 955 2.037 1.0053 361
109 108 21 1091 1081 2.081 1.0049 392
113 112 16 227 785 2.044 1.0058 325
127 126 18 509 1009 2.002 1.0047 408
256 128 16 257 1025 1.999 1.0051 373
Figure 4.1: Parameters for 64 ≤ n ≤ 128, k prime or a power of two.
Consider the function len(d) = pn/dδd. According to Gama and Nguyen [GN08]2 this is
the Euclidean size of the smallest vector we are likely to find when reducing a sublattice
with dimension d of any SWIFFT lattice Λ⊥p (â). Micciancio and Regev observed in [MR09]
that this function takes its minimal value
len(dmin) = δ
2
√
n log(p)/ log(δ) for dmin =
√
n log(p)/ log(δ).
We recall that a pseudo-collision is a vector in Λ⊥p (â) with Euclidean norm at least
√
nm.
In order to find such a vector, we need a δ, such that len(dmin) ≤
√
nm. We say this is
the Hermite factor required for finding pseudo-collisions, and the corresponding dmin is
the minimal dimension where we can expect to find a pseudo-collision. Note that these
minimal dimensions are about 5 times smaller than the corresponding dimensions of the
SWIFFT lattices. To give an intuition, Gama and Nguyen state that the best lattice
reduction algorithms known today can achieve a Hermite factor of roughly δ = 1.01 in
high dimensions within acceptable time.
4.4.1 Recommended Parameters
We will give arguments in Section 4.5.3 that parameters sets with d ≥ 260 correspond to
SWIFFT instances where finding pseudo-collisions should be considered infeasible. The
smallest set of such parameters in Figure 4.1 are
(n,m, p) = (96, 18, 389).
2Their experiments were performed on random lattices following a different distribution, but experimen-
tally their results apply here as well.
25
4 Lattice-Based Compression Functions
We will see that finding pseudo-collisions for these parameters is as hard as breaking a
127-bit symmetric cipher, whereas, for the original SWIFFT parameters, finding such
collisions only compares to breaking a 68-bit symmetric cipher.
Note that most of the efficiency improvements we outlined in Section 4.4 for the original
SWIFFT function are still possible with these parameters. Recall Equation 4.3.2, since
k = 97 is prime we can set ωj ← ωj+1 for any element ω of order k in Zp. To achieve
optimal performance, we recommend to split up the indices l = l0 + 8l1, where 0 ≤ l0 ≤ 7
and 0 ≤ l1 ≤ 11, similarly for the index j, and finally use ω = 275, since multiplying with
ω8 = 16 can then be realized with bit-shifts. Corresponding to Equation 4.3.2 we get
x′i,j0+8j1 =
7∑
l0=0
ω8l0j1 · ωl0(j0+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ml0,j0
·
11∑
l1=0
ωl1(8j0+64j1+8) xi,l0+8l1︸ ︷︷ ︸
tl0,j0,j1
mod p.
Note that the precomputed t part depends on j1 now, and needs to be available for 2
12
possible xi,l. So this part will need 12 · 24 = 192 times the space it did before. Doing the
same reasoning as before, the number of operations (are their relative increase in percent)
is:
18 · 64︸ ︷︷ ︸
computing x′i,j
+ 18 · 96︸ ︷︷ ︸
all a′i,j · x′i,j
= 2880 (+40%) multiplications
18 · 12 · 24︸ ︷︷ ︸
computing x′i,j
+ 18 · 96− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
summing a′i,j · x′i,j
= 6911 (+68%) additions/subtractions
Overall, we have a huge increase in security, almost doubling the effort required to find
pseudo-collisions and a comparatively small loss in efficiency.
4.5 Security Analysis
The collision resistance of SWIFFT has the desirable property of being reducible from a
worst-case computational problem. In particular, this means an algorithm which breaks
random instances of SWIFFT compression functions with main parameter n can also
be used to find short nonzero vectors in all ideals of the ring Z[x]/〈xn + 1〉. Finding
such vectors is assumed to be infeasible for large n. However, for the standard SWIFFT
parameter, n = 64, exhaustive search algorithms find these short vectors in less than one
hour. In the lattice challenge [BLR08] open for all enthusiasts, similar problems have been
solved3 up to n = 108. Gama and Nguyen even state that finding the shortest vector in n-
dimensional lattices for n ≤ 70 should be considered easy [GN08]. So, the resulting lower
bound on the attacker’s runtime is insignificant. However, not attacking the underlying
worst-case problem, but a concrete SWIFFT instance is much harder.
We will analyze the practical security of SWIFFT. As we have seen in Section 4.3.1, colli-
sions in the SWIFFT compression functions naturally correspond to vectors with `∞-norm
3See http://www.latticechallenge.org
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bounded by 1 in certain lattices. These may be recovered with lattice basis reduction algo-
rithms. Since these algorithms are highly optimized to find small vectors in the Euclidean
norm, it is reasonable to analyze the computational problem of finding pseudo-collisions
instead of collisions. These are vectors in the smallest ball which contains all vectors
corresponding to collisions, so an algorithm which minimizes the Euclidean norm cannot
distinguish between the two. In this section, we give experimental evidence that according
to a well-known heuristic by Lenstra and Verheul [LV01], finding pseudo-collisions for the
standard SWIFFT parameters is comparable to breaking a 68-bit symmetric cipher. In
comparison, all other attacks analyzed by the SWIFFT authors take 2106 operations and
almost as much space.
In their original proposal of SWIFFT, Lyubashevsky et al. provide a first analysis of all
standard attacks. When it comes to attacks using lattice reduction however, they state
that the dimension 1024 of SWIFFT lattices is too big for current algorithms. We start
by showing that reducing sublattices of dimension 251, which corresponds to m = 4, is
sufficient to find pseudo-collisions and dimension 325 (m = 5) is sufficient for collisions.
Beyond this point, as Micciancio and Regev observe in [MR09], “the problem [SVP] cannot
become harder by increasing m”. This means if we find a pseudo-collision in dimension
251, we can pad it with zeros to obtain a pseudo-collision for SWIFFT. In practice, even
dimension d = 205 is sufficient to find pseudo-collisions (cf. Figure 4.1). In particular,
this means that SWIFFTX, where internally SWIFFT is used with m = 32, is not more
secure than SWIFFT.
4.5.1 Existence of (Pseudo-)Collisions in d-Dimensional Sublattices
Naturally, lattice basis reduction algorithms run much faster on lattices of small dimension.
So, we want to find the minimal dimension d such that a d-dimensional sublattice of the
SWIFFT lattice still contains a vector corresponding to a pseudo-collision.
The method we have given in Section 4.4 for choosing the dimension d is heuristic,
because it is based on an observation by Gama and Nguyen that is experimentally sound
but unproven. We will now give a related result independent of experiments but dependent
on the structure of SWIFFT sublattices. It is a pigeonhole argument, which gives an upper
bound on the best subdimension d.
Let hâ be a random SWIFFT compression function with parameters (n,m, p). The
range of this function has size |R| = pn.
Furthermore, let D be the set of all vectors in a d-dimensional submodule of Znm that
have Euclidean norm less than r =
√
nm/2. Clearly, if D where a subspace of Rnm, then,
under the same conditions, its volume would be that of a d-dimensional ball with radius
r, i.e. rdpid/2/Γ(d/2 + 1). So, counting only integer points, we come to approximately the
same number and get
|D| ≈ rdpid/2/Γ(d/2 + 1).
This approximation is tight for d > 100.
We change the domain of hâ to D. Now, any collision in the modified hâ corresponds
to a pseudo-collision of the SWIFFT function we started with, because whenever two
elements v1, v2 ∈ D are mapped to the same output under hâ, then v1 − v2 is mapped 0
and by the triangle inequality, ‖v1 − v2‖ ≤ 2r =
√
nm.
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Comparing the sizes of domain and range, we find that these collisions exist by the
pigeonhole principle for all d ≥ 251. So the dimension d = 205 suggested by the heuristic
looks too optimistic, but remember that this argument only gives an upper bound on the
required d and does not take into account the randomness in the choice of â.
The situation for proper collisions is similar. Here, we shrink the input to all vectors
that have d coefficients in {0, 1} and the rest equal to 0. Whichever coefficients we pick,
the size of this domain is always |D| = 2d. Collisions of this restricted function now
correspond to proper collisions of the SWIFFT function we started with. By the same
arguments as before, those collisions exist for d ≥ 513.
However, a different analysis is possible here. It is one which does take into account the
randomness of â and reveals that proper collisions exist for all d ≥ 325.
4.5.2 Existence of Collisions in d-Dimensional Sublattices
In this section, we analyze how probable it is that vectors with trinary coefficients exist in
a d-dimensional sublattice of the SWIFFT lattice. These correspond to proper collisions
of the SWIFFT function. Unlike before, we will now take into account the randomness
introduced by the choice of the compression function key â. Let A be such that the
SWIFFT function extended to the full domain Rn,p is hâ(v) = Av mod p. Then, the
SWIFFT lattice is given by the kernel of A over Zp and the d-dimensional sublattices
correspond to kernels of submatrices of A with d columns.
If, for example, â is chosen such that the i-th column in the corresponding A matrix is
zero, then there is a binary vector in every d-dimensional sublattice where the correspond-
ing submatrix contains the i-th column of A. So, the randomness of â has some influence
on the existence of vectors that correspond to collisions.
For simplicity, we deal with the case that the key defining the hash function, now given
by the matrix A, is unstructured and chosen uniformly at random from Zn×nmp . The
following lemma gives the probability that a randomly chosen SWIFFT instance has no
collisions.
Lemma 4.5.1. Let T = {0,±1}d \ {0} and A ∈ Zn×dq be chosen uniformly at random,
then
Pr[ ∀v ∈ T,Av mod q 6= 0] =
d−1∏
i=0
(
max{qn − 3i, 0}/qn
)
.
Proof. Consider the columns of A being drawn consecutively. We count the number of
cases where the condition we check for holds. Certainly the condition is true if and only
if the first drawn column is nonzero, giving (qn − 1) positive cases. Let the first column
we drew be a1. For the condition to remain true, the second column must not be in the
set {0,±1}a1, giving (qn − 3) positive cases. Similarly, the third column must not be in
{0,±1}a1 + {0,±1}a2, which yields qn − 32 positive cases. An induction on d validates
the given formula.
Some exemplary probabilities for the existence of trinary vectors in a d-dimensional
SWIFFT sublattice are:
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n m p δ d
64 16 29 1.0140 125
64 16 33 1.0135 130
64 16 37 1.0131 134
64 16 41 1.0127 138
64 16 45 1.0124 141
64 16 49 1.0121 144
64 16 53 1.0119 147
64 16 57 1.0117 150
64 16 61 1.0115 152
Figure 4.2: Parameters used for our experiments.
d 273 · · · 299 · · · 325
Pr 2−80 2−39 1
4.5.3 Lattice Basis Reduction Experiments
For our experiments we chose the sublattice dimension where lattice basis reduction algo-
rithms like LLL/BKZ behave optimal in practice (see Section 4.4). We then proceeded to
compare the following lattice basis reduction algorithms to see which one performs best
in practice on the lattices in our experiment. BKZ as implemented in version 5.5.1 of the
“Number Theory Library”(NTL) by Shoup [Sho], Primal-Dual (PD) as implemented by
Filipovic´4 and Koy, and finally RSR as implemented by Ludwig5. Both latter algorithms
are available on request from the authors. It became apparent that Primal-Dual runs
much slower than both competitors, so for the main experiment we omitted it.
For our experiments, we fixed n = 64, m = 16 to their standard values and chose the
third parameter p variable. This results in a steady decrease in the Hermite factor and
increase in the dimension required to find pseudo-collisions (see Figure 4.2). We found
that for smaller values of p, corresponding to smaller values of d, pseudo-collisions were
found too fast to make sensible measurements.
For each of these 9 parameter sets, we created 10 random SWIFFT lattices using the
pseudorandom number generator, which is part of NTL. We then proceeded to break all
instances with the NTL floating-point variant of BKZ (bkzfp), by increasing the BKZ
parameter β until a pseudo-collision was found and recording the total time taken in
each case. We also broke all instances with a floating-point variant of Schnorr’s Random
Sampling Reduction (RSR) algorithm [Sch03] (rsrfp) implemented by Ludwig [BL06] using
the parameters δ = 0.9, u = 22 and again increasing β until a pseudo-collision was found.
In all cases, we computed the average runtime of both algorithms and plotted the base 2
log of this value relative to the dimension d. We also plotted a conservative extrapolation
(assuming linear growth in logscale) for the average runtime of both algorithms (see Figure
4PD, Bartol Filipovic´, bartol.filipovic@sit.fraunhofer.de
5PSR, Christoph Ludwig, cludwig@cdc.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de
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Figure 4.3: Average runtimes of our experiments.
4.3). The same growth assumption has often been made when analyzing NTRU lattices
[HHHGW09]. The resulting approximation for the runtime t of rsrfp, the experimentally
faster algorithm, is
log2(t) = 0.577254 · d− 73.459. (4.5.1)
All our experiments were run on a single 2.3 GHz AMD Opteron processor. According to
the predictions of Lenstra and Verheul [LV01], the computational hardness of a problem
solved after t seconds on such a machine is comparable to breaking a k-bit symmetric
cipher, where
k = log2(t) + log2(2300)− log2(60 · 60 · 24 · 365.25)− log2(5 · 105) + 56. (4.5.2)
Using the data in Figure 4.3, we can compute the security level k corresponding to the
average runtime of each algorithm relative to the dimension d for each parameter set.
As we have seen in Figure 4.1, the rightmost side of Figure 4.3 (d = 206) corresponds to a
real SWIFFT lattice. The extrapolated symmetric bit security for finding pseudo-collisions
on these lattices is k = 68.202. Inserting Equation (4.5.1) into Equation (4.5.2), we find
that any parameter set where d ≥ 260 would correspond to a cipher with symmetric bit-
security at least 100 according to our extrapolation. Parameters realizing this paradigm
are given in Section 4.4.1.
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Lattice-Based Zero-Knowledge
Identification
Zero-knowledge identification schemes solve the problem of authenticating one party to
another via an insecure channel without disclosing any additional information that might
be used by an impersonator. In this chapter we propose a scheme whose security relies on
the existence of a commitment scheme and on the hardness of worst-case lattice problems.
To this end, we adapt a code-based identification scheme by Cayrel and Ve´ron which
constitutes an improvement of another code-based scheme by Stern. Our solution sports
analogous improvements over the lattice adaption of Stern’s scheme which Kawachi et al.
presented at ASIACRYPT 2008 [KTX08]. Specifically, due to a smaller cheating proba-
bility close to 1/2 and a similar communication cost, any desired level of security will be
achieved in fewer rounds. Compared to Lyubashevsky’s scheme presented at ASIACRYPT
2009 [Lyu09], our proposal, like Kawachi’s, offers a milder security assumption: namely,
the hardness of (Ideal)SIS for trinary solutions. The same assumption was used for the
SWIFFT hash function, which is secure for much smaller parameters than those required
by Lyubashevsky.
This chapter is based on a joint work with Pierre-Louis Cayrel, Markus Ru¨ckert, and
Rosemberg Andre´ da Silva [CLRS10a]. It will be presented in October at the Fourth
International Conference on Provable Security (ProvSec 2010) in Malacca, Malaysia.
5.1 Introduction
One of the main objectives in cryptography is to provide means of access control, and
identification (ID) schemes are typically applied in order to reach this goal. These schemes
describe interactive protocols between a designated prover and verifier with the purpose
of demonstrating that the prover knows a secret that is associated with his identity. In
zero-knowledge schemes, no information about this secret is revealed, except the fact that
the prover knows it. Besides, using hard lattice problems as security basis allows for very
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mild assumptions in the sense that they are worst-case instead of average-case and provide
resistance against quantum adversaries.
There is an efficient generic construction due to Fiat and Shamir that transforms any ID
scheme into a signature scheme, in the random oracle model [FS86]. Therefore, having an
efficient ID solution from lattices gives rise to a similarly efficient signature construction,
keeping the same hardness assumption. One of the main hardness assumption for ID
schemes based on lattices is the short integer solution (SIS) problem. One is given an
average case instance A ∈ Zn×mq , m = Ω(n log(n)), and a norm bound b. Then, the task
is to find a nonzero vector v ∈ Zm such that Av ≡ 0 (mod q) and ‖v‖∞ ≤ b. This is hard
to accomplish as long as there is at least one single n-dimensional lattice, where solving
the approximate shortest vector problem is hard for approximation factors γ ≥ b · O˜(1).
Hence, it is desirable to build an ID scheme based on SIS with the least possible norm
bound b, which is b = 1.
The most relevant ID schemes based on number theoretic problems, e.g., [FS86] and
[FFS87], do not resist quantum computer attacks that use Shor’s algorithm [Sho94]. One
of the first schemes to resist such attacks was proposed by Stern [Ste93]. It relies on
the syndrome decoding problem and uses of a 3-pass zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
(ZK-PoK) with a soundness error of 2/3 and perfect completeness. Recently, Kawachi,
Tanaka, and Xagawa [KTX08] were able to change the security assumption of Stern’s
scheme to SIS with norm bound 1. With their work, Kawachi et al. provide a more efficient
alternative to Lyubashevsky’s scheme [Lyu08a, Lyu09], which uses a stronger assumption,
namely SIS with norm bound O(n2 log(n)). In contrast to typical zero-knowledge schemes,
Lyubashevsky’s construction is based on a witness-indistinguishable (not zero-knowledge)
proof of knowledge. Furthermore, it has no soundness error, but instead a completeness
error of 1−1/e, which leads to increased communication costs and the undesirable scenario
of having an honest prover being rejected by the verifier.
In code-based cryptography, there is also the scheme proposed by Cayrel and Ve´ron
[CV10] that improves the Stern’s scheme by reducing the soundness error to q/(2(q−1)) ≈
1/2. This improvement leads to lower the communication cost, when comparing both
schemes for a given security level. Currently, in terms of efficiency, there is no practical
lattice-based construction that is comparable to that put forward by Cayrel and Ve´ron.
We propose such a scheme with a soundness error of (q + 1)/2q ≈ 1/2 and perfect
completeness. It is based on the same efficient version of the SIS problem that is used
by Kawachi et al. or by the SWIFFT compression function [LMPR08]. Both the small
soundness error and the mild assumption make our scheme more efficient than previous
lattice-based ones. Moreover, by transferring code-based constructions to lattices, we can
exploit efficiency improvements using ideal lattices without losing provable security. As
a result, our scheme has smaller public keys and more efficient operations than those
associated with the current code-based ID schemes.
For a comparison with the most recent lattice-based ID schemes, see Figure 5.1, which
assumes that the parameters listed in Figure 5.4 are used, and that a soundness error
of 2−16 (one of the values recommended in the norm ISO/IEC 9798) is specified. We
computed that Lyubashevky’s scheme takes 11 rounds to reach a completeness error below
1%, when it is using the most efficient parameters listed in [Lyu09].
The content of this chapter is organized as follows. We present the concepts that are
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Scheme Secret key Public key Rounds Communication SIS Norm
[Kbyte] [Kbyte] [Kbyte] Bound
Lyubashevsky [Lyu09] 0,25 2,00 11 110,00 O˜(n2)
Kawachi et al. [KTX08] 0,25 0,06 27 58,67 1
Section 5.3 0,25 0,06 17 37,50 1
Figure 5.1: Comparison of lattice-based identification schemes.
used in the construction of the identification scheme in Section 5.2. Later, in Section 5.3,
we describe our proposed identification scheme as well as those from which it is derived,
namely the original identification schemes by Stern, and an improved code-based variant
by Cayrel and Ve´ron. Afterwards, We give a detailed description of the algorithms that
comprise the new scheme, and discuss the decisions that were made from a performance
and security point of view in Section 5.4. Then, we provide a comprehensive analysis of
both theoretical and practical security, and propose concrete parameters for our scheme
in Section 5.4.
5.2 Setup
We generally follow the security notions and notations put forward by Kawachi et al. in
[KTX08]. They give a well-founded introduction to the field of zero-knowledge identifi-
cation and also present a lattice-based scheme. In this section, we give quick overview of
some important concepts.
String commitment schemes. A string commitment scheme is a protocol between two
parties, sender and receiver. It works as follows: Both parties agree on a deterministic
commitment function Com from a suitable family. This can be be realized, e.g., with a
trusted third party. The scheme runs in two phases named committing and revealing.
In the commitment phase, the sender commits to a string s by choosing string ρ uni-
formly at random and computing c←− Com(s, ρ), which he sends to the receiver. In the
revealing phase, which may take place much later, the sender sends both the string s and
his chosen randomness ρ to the receiver. Then the receiver checks if c = Com(s, ρ) holds.
For our main protocol, we will use a commitment scheme which is secure in the sense
that it is both hiding and binding. Informally, we say the scheme is statistically hiding, if a
computationally unbounded attacking receiver has no noticeable advantage when assigning
two commitments c, c′ to their respective strings s, s′ correctly. We say the scheme is
computationally binding, if an attacking sender running in polynomial-time cannot change
the commitment c to another value which passes the check in the revealing phase. Refer
to e.g., [HM96] for a formal definition.
Security Model. In our model, we employ a string commitment scheme in the trusted
setup model, according to which a trusted party honestly sets up the system parameters
for the sender and the receiver.
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We will show that our scheme is secure against, impersonation under concurrent attacks.
This implies that we allow the adversary to play the role of a cheating verifier prior to
impersonation, possibly interacting with many different prover clones concurrently. Such
clones share the same secret key, but have independent coins and keep their own state. As
stated in [BP02], security against this kind of attack implies security against impersonation
under active attacks.
Throughout this chapter, we will use the concept of zero-knowledge interactive proof of
knowledge systems. In this context, an entity called prover P has as goal to convince a
probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) verifier V that a given string x belongs to a language
L, without revealing any more information.
This kind of proof system must satisfy three properties:
Completeness. For any string x belonging to the language, the prover can successfully
convince the verifier. That is,
∀x ∈ L Pr [(P, V ) [x] = YES] ≥ 1− negligible(k).
Here, (P, V ) denotes the protocol describing the interaction between prover and
verifier, and negligible(k) is a negligible function on some security parameter k.
Soundness. For any string x not in the language, any malicious PPT prover cannot
convince the verifier with probability better than 1/2. That is,
∀x /∈ L ∀P ′ Pr [(P ′, V ) [x] = YES] ≤ 1/2.
Zero-knowledge. Anything one could learn by listening to P , one could also have sim-
ulated by oneself. That is, ∀V ′PPT ∃SPPT ∀x ∈ L VIEWP,V ′(x) close to S(x). Here,
VIEW represents the distribution of the transcript of the communication between
prover and verifier, and S(x) represents the distribution of the simulation of such
interaction. Depending on the proximity of VIEWP,V ′(x) and S(x), as defined in
[GMR85], one can have:
• Perfect Zero-knowledge, if the distributions produced by the simulator and the
proof protocol are exactly the same.
• Statistical Zero-knowledge, if the statistical distance between the distributions
produced by the simulator and the proof protocol is a negligible function.
• Computational Zero-knowledge, if the distributions produced by the simulator
and the proof protocol are indistinguishable to any efficient algorithm.
5.3 Identification Schemes
An identification scheme is a collection of algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, Prover, Verifier)
meant to provide a proof of identity. The Setup algorithm takes as input a security
parameter and generates structures (such as a lattice or code basis) to be used by the
other algorithms. The KeyGen algorithm takes as input the parameters generated by
Setup and derives key pairs (private, public) to be associated with a set of users. The
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Prover and Verifier algorithms correspond to a protocol that is executed by entities P and
V , respectively, such that the former convinces the latter of its identity’s authenticity, by
proving to know the solution to a hard problem, which establishes the relation between
the components of P ’s key pair.
Stern’s Identification Scheme. The first practical code-based identification scheme was
proposed by Stern [Ste93]. Its basic algorithm uses a hash function h, a pair of keys (i, s)
related by i = HT s, where H is a public parity check matrix of a given code, s is a private
binary vector of Hamming weight p, and i is its public syndrome. In a given round, y is
chosen uniformly at random from the same space as s, a permutation σ of the integers
{1, . . . ,dim(y)} is similarly chosen, and the commitments are calculated by the prover as
follows
c1 = h(σ‖HTy)
c2 = h(σ(y))
c3 = h(σ(y ⊕ s)).
Upon receipt of a challenge b chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1, 2}, the prover reveals
the information that enables the verifier to check the correctness of the commitments as
below:
b = 0 : Reveal y and σ. Check c1 and c2.
b = 1 : Reveal y ⊕ s and σ. Check c1 and c3.
b = 2 : Reveal σ(y) and σ(s). Check c2, c3, and wt(σ(s)) = p
This scheme has a soundness error of 2/3. In order to reach a confidence level L on the
authenticity of the prover, it has to be repeated a number r of times, so that 1−(2/3)r ≥ L.
In the same work, Stern also proposed a few variants of the basic scheme focusing
on specific goals, such as: minimize computing load, minimize number of rounds, ap-
ply identity-based construction, and employ an analogy of modular knapsacks. For the
minimization of number of rounds, he suggested the following solution:
1. The private key s is replaced by the generators {s1, . . . , sm} of a simplex code.
2. Two commitments c1 = h(σ‖HTy) and c2 = h
(
σ(y)‖σ(s1)‖ . . . ‖σ(sn)
)
are used.
3. The prover computes z = σ(y ⊕⊕mj=1 bjsj) using a binary vector {b1, . . . , bm} re-
ceived from the verifier.
4. Upon challenge 0, the prover reveals σ, and the verifier checks c1.
5. Upon challenge 1, the prover discloses {σ(s1), . . . , σ(sm)}, and the verifier checks
that c2 is correct and that the code generated by {s1, . . . , sm} is simplex with the
required weight.
This solution replaces the 3-pass approach by a 5-pass one, but it is not effective as far
as communication costs are regarded. A more efficient solution is shown in the following
paragraph. It also corresponds to the underlying approach for our lattice-based solution.
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Cayrel and Ve´ron’s Identification Scheme. The identification scheme proposed by Stern
[Ste93] was based on the hardness of the syndrome decoding problem. An improvement
over this scheme, using the dual construction, was proposed by Ve´ron [Ve´r96], achieving
lower communication costs and better efficiency. Like the basic Stern construct, however,
a dishonest prover can have success with probability up to 2/3 in any given round.
By modifying the way the commitments are computed, incorporating a value chosen
at random by the verifier, Cayrel and Ve´ron [CV10] were able to bound the cheating
probability within a given round close to 1/2, with similar communication costs. The
approach followed will be outlined later for the case of our scheme in Algorithm 5.3, where
the syndrome decoding problem is replaced by the shortest vector problem as hardness
assumption. It involves a 5-pass solution, similar to Stern’s construction. However, it
avoids the heavy payload associated with transmitting the whole basis of a code (or of a
lattice).
Another scheme suggested by Gaborit requires smaller storage for public data [GG07].
Given that the schemes we have seen are dealing with codes, this usually implies that a
generator matrix or a parity check matrix is needed to fully characterize them. The idea
applied by Gaborit was to use double-circulant matrices for a compact representation.
In our work, we point out that a combination of these two approaches can be used in
the lattice context, namely ideal lattices. These allow a very compact representation, as
efficient as double-circulant matrices, for an identification scheme structure with soundness
error close to 1/2. With this, we manage to have the lowest communication costs and
lowest public data storage needs.
Taking Cayrel and Ve´ron’s basic idea as basis and changing the main security assump-
tion from the syndrome decoding problem (code-based) to the short integer solution prob-
lem for ideal lattices (IdealSIS), we obtain a new identification scheme. The transformation
is non-trivial, since low-weight codewords that are required in one setting are not neces-
sarily short vectors as required in the other and vice versa.
We begin by describing the new identification scheme and then give arguments regard-
ing all major properties such as completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge as well as
performance.
Our Identification Scheme. The scheme consists of two main parts: a key generation
algorithm (Figure 5.2) and an interactive identification protocol (Figure 5.3).
The key generation algorithm receives as input parameters (n,m, q), e.g., (64, 2048, 257).
In Section 5.4.2 we will argue that this is a sensible choice. It chooses a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq
uniformly at random and selects as private key a binary vector x ∈ {0, 1}m of Hamming
weight m/2. The public key consists of an n-dimensional vector y = Ax mod q, the
random matrix A, and a commitment function Com. To instantiate the algorithm, we
need to select a family of statistically hiding and computationally binding commitment
functions F .
For the time being we recommend the commitment functions used by Kawachi et al. since
they merely require a lattice-based collision resistant, regular hash function, in our case
SWIFFT, which allows us to have a single security assumption. The commitment functions
Com that we use are deterministic algorithms, which get as second input a nonce r that is
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KeyGen:
x
$←− {0, 1}m, s.t. wt(x) = m/2
A
$←− Zn×mq
y←− Ax mod q
Com
$←− F , suitable family of commitment functions
Output (sk, pk) = (x, (y,A,Com))
Figure 5.2: Key generation algorithm, parameters n,m, q are public.
Prover P(sk, pk) Verifier V(pk)
(sk, pk) = (x, (y,A,Com))←− KeyGen
u
$←− Zmq , σ $←− Sm, z←− Pσx
r0
$←− {0, 1}n, r1 $←− {0, 1}n
c0 ←− Com(σ ‖Au; r0)
c1 ←− Com(z ‖Pσu; r1) c0, c1−−−−−−−−−−−−→
α←−−−−−−−−−−−− α $←− Zq
β ←− Pσ(u + αx) β−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Challenge b←−−−−−−−−−−−− b $←− {0, 1}
If b = 0:
σ, r0−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check c0 ?= Com(σ ‖AP−1σ β − αy; r0)
σ
?∈ Sm
Else:
z, r1−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check c1 ?= Com(z ‖ β − αz; r1)
z
?∈ {0, 1}m,wt(z) ?= m/2
Figure 5.3: Identification protocol
assumed to be chosen uniformly at random from a set big enough to guarantee the hiding
property of the commitment.
The identification protocol in Figure 5.3 describes the interaction between prover and
verifier in order to convince the second party about the identity of the first. All computa-
tion in the protocol is performed modulo q, and we use the following notations. The set
of all permutations on m elements is Sm. Any permutation σ ∈ Sm is a linear operation
and the associated m×m binary matrix is Pσ.
The protocol is an adaptation of the code-based identification scheme [CV10] which
represents a major improvement to Ve´ron’s [Ve´r96] and Stern’s [Ste93] schemes. In the
same way our protocol represents an improvement over the lattice adaptations of Stern’s
scheme by Kawachi et al. [KTX08]. Like Kawachi’s, our adaptation to the lattice setting
is non-trivial, since we need to ensure that a binary secret key is used (regardless of the
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Hamming weight). This needs to be guaranteed throughout the protocol, which entails
some change in the β that is used. Similarly to the coding-based scheme, a cheating prover,
not knowing the secret key, can lead a verifier to believe that he actually knows that
secret value with a probability up to 1/2 in an individual round of execution. Therefore,
in order to diminish the success rate of such an impersonation, the protocol has to be
repeated a number of times, which is a function of the degree of confidence requested by
the application that is using the scheme. This will be discussed further in Section 5.4,
where we argue the soundness.
In the commitment phase, the prover commits to two values c0, c1, where c0 is comprised
of the random choices he made and c1 contains information about his secret key. An
adversary that can also correctly compute them with overwhelming probability either is
able to break the commitment or to solve the hard problem that makes it possible to
obtain a private key from its public counterpart. Those commitments are sent to the
verifier, who responds in the second phase with value α taken uniformly at random from
Zq. Upon receipt of the this value, the prover is supposed to multiply it by the private
key, add to a permuted masking value u (uniformly chosen at random from Zmq ) and make
a permutation over the sum. Since u was random, β can be seen as a random variable
with uniform distribution over Zmq , leaking no information about the private key x.
Upon receipt of this value, the verifier makes a challenge to the prover, picking a value
uniformly at random from the set {0, 1}. The prover responds to it by revealing some piece
of information that allows the verifier to compute and check the commitments. An honest
prover will always be able to respond to either challenge. Besides checking the correctness
of the commitments, the verifier must also check that the values disclosed by the prover
are well-formed, although in practice this would be solved by defining a suitable encoding
for the data.
We will see in Section 5.4.1 how an impersonator can always cheat with a success
probability of 1/2, and that no better strategy is possible under our hardness assumptions.
So in order to reach a prescribed level of security, the interaction proposed here must be
repeated an appropriate number of times.
Ideal lattices. The present construction makes no assumptions about the structure of
the SIS matrix A. Therefore, the space necessary for storing this matrix is O˜(n2), which is
too big for practical purposes. Using ideal lattices, one can reduce such space requirements
to O˜(n) and simultaneously increase computation speed of matrix vector products in the
form Ax to O˜(n) operations. This has been proposed and performed many times, perhaps
most elegantly in the case of the SWIFFT compression function [LMPR08].
Signature via Fiat-Shamir heuristics. If the verifier is replaced by a random oracle, one
can derive signature schemes from identification counterparts. As pointed out by Lyuba-
shevsky when comparing his lattice-based identification scheme [Lyu09] with Kawachi’s
solution [KTX08], the latter does not result in an efficient signature scheme due to the
fact that every bit of the challenge (thus, each bit of a message digest when we consider
a signature application) results in a reasonable amount of data sent by the prover. For a
240-bit message digest, for example, Kawachi’s scheme would result in a signature of over
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two million bits when applying Fiat-Shamir heuristics.
Our identification scheme, however, has some characteristics of Lyubashevsky’s, in the
sense that we can relate a message digest with the variable α that the verifier sends to the
prover in “pass 2” of Algorithm 5.3, instead of doing it with the challenge bits. Thus, we
can make the field from which such a variable is defined to have a width that better suits
the signature scheme needs, circumventing the drawback pointed out above. At the same
time, we need to ensure that the total number of rounds we run the scheme is bigger than
the desired bit-security level of the resulting signature. This is because an attacker who
can correctly guess the challenge bits for each round can generate a signature.
Our identification scheme has successfully been used with an extension of the usual
Fiat-Shamir transform to derive a threshold ring signature scheme [CLRS10b].
5.4 Security Analysis
In this section we show that the protocol in Figure 5.3 corresponds to a zero-knowledge
interactive proof of knowledge of the predicate defined below. Let I = {A,y,m, q} be
public data shared by the parties A and B. Consider the predicate P (I,x) as “x is a
binary vector of Hamming weight m/2 satisfying the equation Ax = y mod q”.
We provide below proofs for the completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge properties
of the identification scheme described in Figure 5.3. In particular, soundness holds even
against concurrent attacks, i.e., an adversary may try to impersonate a given identity
after having access to polynomially many verifier instances in parallel. Each of the verifier
instances has the same secret key but is run with a different random tape. The challenge is
to simulate the environment of the attacker during these interactions and still being able
to extract “useful” information from the adversary during the impersonation phase. The
required assumptions are that Com is a statistically hiding and computationally binding
commitment scheme, e.g., based on SIS (cf. [KTX08]), and the hardness of the SIS problem.
Completeness. Given that an honest prover has knowledge of the private key x, the
blending mask u and the permutations Pσ , he will always be able to derive the commit-
ments c0 and c1, and reveal to the verifier the information necessary to verify that they
are correct. He can also show that the private key in his possession has the appropriate
Hamming weight. So the verifier will always accept the honest prover’s identity in any
given round. This implies perfect completeness.
Zero-Knowledge. We give a demonstration of the zero-knowledge property for the iden-
tification protocol shown in Figure 5.3. Here, we require the commitment function Com
to be statistically hiding, i.e., Com(x; r) is indistinguishable from uniform for a uniform
r ∈ {0, 1}n.
Theorem 5.4.1. Let q be prime. The described protocol is a statistically zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge if the employed commitment scheme is statistically-hiding.
Proof. To prove the zero-knowledge property of our protocol, we construct a simulator S
that outputs a protocol view VIEW = (c0, c1, α, β, b, (σ, r0), (z, r1)) without knowing the
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secret x, such that VIEW is indistinguishable from an interaction of the honest prover
and verifier. It has access to a cheating verifier V ∗, which contributes α and b. Therefore,
S generates r1, r2 according to protocol and it gets (A,y,Com) as input. The simulator
has to guess b before talking to V ∗. For the moment, let us assume the guess is correct.
If b = 0, the simulator selects u and σ according to protocol and solves Ax ≡ y (mod q)
for x, which does not need to be short. With this pseudo secret key, the simulator computes
c0 and c1 according to the protocol. The deviation in c1 is not recognized because Com is
statistically hiding. Then, S computes β ←− Pσ(u+αx) after obtaining α from V ∗(c1, c2).
The result is uniform because u is chosen uniformly at random. As a result, S can reveal
(σ, r0), which passes the verification for b = 0.
If b = 1, the simulator needs to play against the second verification branch. It selects a
binary x with Hamming weight m/2 and selects σ as per protocol. It computes c1, c2 and
obtains α←− V ∗(c1, c2). Then, it computes β ←− Pσ(u + αx). As a result, S can reveal
Pσx that passes verification.
In consequence, the simulator outputs a correct view with probability 1/2. Since the
simulator has access to V ∗, it can restart the verifier whenever the guess b was incorrect.
The result is a statistically close simulation if Com is statistically hiding.
Soundness. We now show that a dishonest prover is able to cheat a verifier to accept his
identity with a probability limited by (q + 1)/2q ≈ 1/2. The number of possible queries
sent by the verifier to a prover is given by all combinations of challenge bits b ∈ {0, 1} and
α ∈ {0, . . . , q− 1} Hence, there are 2q possible queries. Say the dishonest prover wants to
answer all challenges where b = 0, then he computes an alternate secret key x′ with large
entries such that Ax′ = y. This can be done with Gaussian elimination, for example. At
the same time, when α = 0 he can also answer in the case b = 1 by sending a random z.
Since α = 0 this is not checked in the commitment.
Note that the α = 0 query issue cannot be resolved by removing 0 from the set that α is
drawn from, because the dishonest verifier can effectively shift the values of α by changing
his protocol. Say he wants some fix α0 to take the place of 0 in the unmodified scheme,
then he changes both the computations of the commitments and β to:
c0 ←− Com(σ ‖Au− α0y; r0), β ←− Pσ(u + (α− α0)x),
c1 ←− Com(z ‖Pσu− α0z; r1).
In effect, he can answer both challenge bits b = 0, 1 for α = α0 now.
Thus, in total, the adversary can answer correctly for q + 1 out of 2q queries. In the
proof, we show that if an adversary is able to answer more queries, it is also able to break
one of the underlying assumptions, i.e., solve SIS or break the commitment.
Theorem 5.4.2. If an honest verifier accepts a dishonest prover with probability Pr ≥
(q+1)/2q+(n), with (n) non-negligible, then there exists a polynomial time probabilistic
machine M which breaks the binding property of the commitment Com or solves the SIS
problem with non-negligible probability.
Proof. Given the SIS problem instance (n,m, q,A) as input and a challenge commitment
function Com, we need to simulate the adversary’s environment in two phases: a verifica-
tion phase and an impersonation phase. In order to correctly prove knowledge of a valid
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secret key x during the verification phase, we choose x and y as in the key generation
protocol and run the adversary A on public parameters (as per protocol).
Therefore, in the verification phase, we can perfectly simulate the prover. Since the
protocol is statistically zero-knowledge, the adversary does not learn any information
about x and the output distribution is the same as for all alternative secret keys x′ 6= x.
After the first phase, we let A play the role of the cheating prover. First, we receive the
commitments c0, c1. Then, because q is polynomial in n, we challenge the adversary with
all 2q challenge pairs (α, b) and record successes as “1” and failures as “0” in a table with
column labels “b = 0”, “b = 1” and row labels “α = 0”,. . .,“α = q − 1”. This is done by
rewinding the adversary appropriately.
For the moment, let us assume that there exist two rows, for α and α′, such that both
columns contain “1”. Let (β, σ, r0) and (β
′, σ′, r′0) be the outcomes for challenge (α, 0)
and (α′, 0), respectively. Furthermore, let (β, z, r1) and (β′, z′, r′1) be the outcomes for
challenges (α, 1) respectively (α′, 1).
Since the commitment Com is binding, we infer that r0 = r
′
0, r1 = r
′
1, and
σ ‖AP−1σ β − αy = σ′ ‖AP−1σ′ β′ − α′y , (5.4.1)
z ‖ β − αz = z′ ‖ β′ − α′z′ . (5.4.2)
Equation 5.4.1 implies σ = σ′. Similarly, Equation 5.4.2 shows that the binary vectors
z, z′ of weight m/2 are equal. Now, we turn to extracting A’s secret key by rearranging
parts of Equations 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. We get
AP−1σ (β − β′)(α− α′)−1 ≡ y (mod q) , (5.4.3)
(β − β′)(α− α′)−1 ≡ z (mod q) . (5.4.4)
This proves that x′ := P−1σ z is a valid secret key and the reduction outputs the short
lattice vector v = x − x′. Notice that we have β 6= β′ because we have Equation 5.4.1,
α 6= α′, and σ = σ′. The extracted secret key is also different from the one of the simulator
because the function Ax mod q compresses the set of valid secret keys and statistically
hides them in the sense that the protocol is also witness indistinguishable. Hence, the
adversary cannot learn the simulator’s key but with probability ≤ 1/2 + n−ω(1)
What is left to show is that such a pair (α, α′) exists. To see this, we apply a simple
counting argument (cf. [OO98]). We know that A can answer correctly for > q + 1
challenges. W.l.o.g., assume that it succeeds ≥ c times for b = 0 and > q+ 1− c times for
b = 1. Thus, there are ≥ c many “1” entries in column “b = 0” and > q+ 1− c many “1”
entries in column “b = 1”.
By way of contradiction, assume that there is no such pair (α, α′) for which A succeeds
for the challenges (α, 0), (α, 1), (α′, 0), and (α′, 1). In other words, assume that the
above extraction procedure breaks down. Then there must be at least c − 1 zeros in
column “b = 0”. In consequence, the total number of entries in the second column is >
c−1+q+1−c. Since this is> q, we arrive at the desired contradiction and conclude that the
knowledge extractor succeeds with non-negligible probability if (n) is non-negligible.
Given that the scheme is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, it is also witness in-
distinguishable with respect to the secret x. Fortunately, witness-indistinguishability is
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preserved under parallel composition. Thus, our scheme can be run many, i.e., ω(log(n))
times in parallel to achieve a negligible soundness error but without increasing the number
of rounds.
5.4.1 Practical Attacks
The code-based identification scheme proposed by Cayrel and Ve´ron and that serves as
starting point for this work has very good performance characteristics. Its security is based
on the assumption that selecting a random generator or parity check matrix will result
in hard instances of the q-ary syndrome decoding problem, though. When adapting this
scheme to use lattices, on the other hand, one achieves a construct based on the hardness
of the SIS problem, and that in turn has a worst-case/average-case reduction.
As pointed out in the description of the algorithms, ideal lattices can also be used in the
scheme to improve performance and reduce the amount of public data. The precautions
regarding (a) the irreducibility of the polynomial that characterizes the ring upon which
the lattice is defined and (b) its expansion factor must be observed, as recommended in
[LM06]. This ensures that finding short vectors in such lattice is still hard to perform.
The present scheme is also secure against active attacks. Thus, an attacker is allowed to
interact with a prover prior to attempting to impersonate him to a verifier. As consequence
of the zero-knowledge property, however, no adversary that interacts with a real prover is
able to obtain any knowledge that can be used later on to impersonate the prover.
We now prove that our scheme is secure against concurrent attacks, by showing that a
public key corresponds to multiple secret keys and that the protocol is witness indistin-
guishable. It is a standard procedure, as seen in [FS90].
First, the existence of multiple secret keys associated with a given public key is assured
by the parameter choice (see Equation 5.4.5). Second, given that our protocol is a zero-
knowledge interactive proof, it is also witness indistinguishable [KP01].
The most efficient way to attack this scheme, but probably the most difficult one,
consists in solving the inhomogeneous short integer solution (ISIS) problem that is defined
by the public key y and the public matrix A, expressed as Ax = y mod q, where x is
expected to be binary, with dimension m and Hamming weight m/2. This equation can be
re-written as A′x′ = 0 mod q, with A′ = [A|y] and x′ = [x|−1]T . Lattice basis calculation
and reduction can then be applied in this second lattice to try to find a solution. The
approximation factor, however, is O˜(n), making the task hard.
5.4.2 Concrete Parameters
In order to guarantee with overwhelming probability that there are other solutions to
Ax = y mod q, besides the private key possessed by the prover (which is pivotal in the
demonstration of security against concurrent attacks), one can make q and m satisfy the
relation below
qn  ∣∣{x ∈ Zm2 : wt(x) = m/2}∣∣. (5.4.5)
Besides, q is bounded by the following theorem, which Micciancio and Regev proved in
[MR04].
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Theorem 5.4.3. For any polynomially bounded functions β(n),m(n), q(n) = nO(1), with
q(n) ≥ 4√m(n)n1.5β(n) and γ(n) = 14pi√nβ(n), there is a probabilistic polynomial time
reduction from solving GapCVPγ in the worst-case to solving SISq,m,γ on the average with
non-negligible probability. In particular, for any m = Θ(n log n), there exists q(n) =
O(n2.5 log n) and γ = O(n
√
log n), such that solving SISq,m on the average is at least as
hard as solving GapSVPγ in the worst case.
Taking as reference the state-of-the-art lattice reduction algorithms studied in [GN08],
the length of the shortest vector that can currently be found by the reduction algorithms
is given (for δ ≈ 1.011) by:
length = min{q, qn/mδm} (5.4.6)
Simply choosing the same parameters that were recommended for SWIFFT, our scheme
We propose the set of parameters below, in Figure 5.4, which are comparable to those used
by the SWIFFT hash function. The best attack on our scheme The best combinatorial
attack for finding short lattice vectors [Wag02] has a computational complexity above 2100
(generalized birthday attack, dividing in 16 groups at each turn). This means that our
security level is 100 bits. In addition to that, the best lattice reduction algorithms return
vectors with Euclidean norm above 42, taking into account our set of parameters. Given
that the private keys resulting from our parameters have Euclidean norm 32, the choice
made is safe. Besides, we can also see that the selected parameters satisfy both Theorem
5.4.3 and the restriction given by Equation 5.4.5.
n m q Commitment Length (bits)
64 2048 257 256
Figure 5.4: Concrete parameters
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In this chapter, we analyze the concrete security and key sizes of theoretically sound lattice-
based encryption schemes based on the “learning with errors” (LWE) problem. Our main
contributions are: (1) a new lattice attack on LWE that combines basis reduction with
an enumeration algorithm admitting a time/success tradeoff, which performs better than
the simple distinguishing attack considered in prior analyses; (2) concrete parameters and
security estimates for an LWE-based cryptosystem that is more compact and efficient than
the well-known schemes from the literature. Our new key sizes are up to 10 times smaller
than prior examples, while providing even stronger concrete security levels.
This chapter is based on a joint work with Chris Peikert [LP11]. It was accepted for the
Cryptographers’ Track of the RSA Conference (CT-RSA) 2011 in San Francisco, USA.
6.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen significant progress in theoretically sound lattice-based cryptogra-
phy, resulting in solutions to many tasks of wide applicability. In the realm of encryption
alone, for example, we now have public-key cryptosystems [AD97, Reg03, Reg05b] with
chosen-ciphertext security [PW08, Pei09], identity-based encryption [GPV08, CHKP10,
ABB10], and a fully homomorphic cryptosystem [Gen09]. Much of this progress has been
greatly aided by the use of simple and flexible average-case problems — namely, the short
integer solution (SIS) introduced by Ajtai [Ajt96b] and the learning with errors (LWE)
problem of Regev [Reg05b] — that are provably as hard as certain lattice problems in
the worst case, and appear to require time exponential in the main security parameter to
solve.
For practical parameters, however, the concrete hardness of the SIS and LWE problems
against algorithmic attacks is still far from a settled issue. This makes it difficult to
assess the actual security and efficiency of cryptographic schemes that are based on these
problems. The purpose of this chapter is to shed further light on this issue, by considering
new variants of known schemes and attacks, and analyzing their consequences in terms of
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key sizes and estimated security.
We analyze the concrete security and efficiency of modern lattice-based cryptographic
schemes, with a focus on LWE and public-key encryption. To start, we describe an LWE-
based cryptosystem that has substantially smaller keys and ciphertexts than the more
well-known systems in the literature (namely, the original system of Regev [Reg05b] and
its more efficient amortized variants [PVW08, GPV08]). Our scheme incorporates several
techniques and perspectives from recent works; in particular, it is an instance of an ab-
stract system described by Micciancio [Mic10] that generalizes all the schemes of [Reg05b,
PVW08, GPV08], and the system’s design and security proof (under the LWE assump-
tion) combine a variety of techniques from recent works [Ale03, MR09, LPS10, Pei10] to
yield asymptotic and concrete improvements in key size. While there are not any new
techniques involved, to our knowledge the literature lacks a full description and analysis
of the system, despite it now being an important target of study.
Our second main contribution is a new and stronger way of using existing algorithmic
attack tools, such as lattice basis reduction and bounded-distance decoding with prepro-
cessing, to analyze the concrete security of recent lattice-based cryptosystems. Our attack
is directed specifically at the LWE problem, and exploits some of its structural properties
in ways that have not been attempted before in a cryptanalytic context. (Our attack also
does not seem immediately applicable to other lattice problems, such as the unique short-
est vector problem, that have been used for public-key encryption [AD97, Reg03, AD07].)
Therefore, we believe that our analysis gives a more accurate assessment of LWE’s concrete
hardness than estimates derived from prior lattice attacks.
Applying our attack to the improved cryptosystem, we then propose concrete parame-
ters and (conservative) runtime estimates for modern commodity hardware. Despite our
improved attacks, the resulting key sizes are still smaller than prior example parameters
by factors as large as 10, even for stronger security levels. (See Section 6.6 for full details.)
For example, using parameters that can encrypt a 128-bit payload and appear to be at
least as secure as AES-128, we obtain public key sizes of about 1, 120 kilobits, or about
400 kilobits assuming a public source of trusted randomness.
Clearly, the above key sizes are still too large for many applications, but this is a
consequence of the quadratic overhead inherent to the use “standard” LWE. By using the
compact “ring-based” variant of LWE and cryptosystem from [LPR10] (which is related
to the heuristic NTRU scheme [HPS98] and the theoretically sound line of works initiated
in [Mic02]), we can immediately shrink the above key sizes by a factor of at least 200. The
resulting sizes of 2-5 kilobits are comparable to modern recommendations for RSA, and
the cryptosystem itself is many times faster on modern hardware.
6.2 Discrete Gaussians and LWE
In this section, we recall some basic facts about the discrete Gaussian distribution and
give a detailed account of its relation to the LWE problem. With this background, we will
be ready to discuss LWE-based encryption schemes.
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6.2.1 Discrete Gaussians
For a lattice Λ and a positive real s > 0, the discrete Gaussian distribution DΛ,s over
Λ with parameter s is the probability distribution having support Λ that assigns a prob-
ability proportional to exp(−pi‖x‖2/s2) to each x ∈ Λ. For Λ = Zn, it is easy to see
(by orthonormality of its standard basis) that the discrete Gaussian DZn,s is simply the
product distribution of n independent copies of DZ,s. There are efficient algorithms for
sampling from a distribution within negligible statistical distance of DZ,s, given any s > 0.
(See, e.g., [GPV08]: for arbitrary s there is a rejection sampling algorithm, and for small
s one can compute a close approximation to the cumulative distribution function.).
We will need two tail bounds on discrete Gaussians.
Lemma 6.2.1 ([Ban93, Lemma 1.5]). Let c ≥ 1 and C = c · exp(1−c22 ) < 1. Then for any
real s > 0 and any integer n ≥ 1, we have
Pr
[
‖DZn,s‖ ≥ c · 1√2pi · s
√
n
]
≤ Cn.
Lemma 6.2.2 ([Ban95, Lemma 2.4]). For any real s > 0 and T > 0, and any x ∈ Rn, we
have
Pr [|〈x, DZn,s〉| ≥ T · s‖x‖] < 2 exp(−pi · T 2).
6.2.2 Learning with Errors
The learning with errors (LWE) problem was introduced by Regev [Reg05b] as a gener-
alization of the well-known ‘learning parity with noise’ problem, to larger moduli. The
problem is parameterized by a dimension n ≥ 1 and an integer modulus q ≥ 2, as well as
an error distribution χ over Z (or its induced distribution over Zq). In this work we will
be concerned only with discrete Gaussian error distributions χ = DZ,s over the integers,
where α := s/q ∈ (0, 1) is often called the (relative) error rate.
For an s ∈ Znq , the LWE distribution As,χ over Znq×Zq is sampled by choosing a uniformly
random a ∈ Znq and error term e← χ, and outputting the pair (a, t = 〈a, s〉+ e mod q) ∈
Znq × Zq. The search version of the LWE problem is, given any desired number of in-
dependent samples (ai, ti) ← As,χ, to find s. The decision version of LWE is to distin-
guish, with non-negligible advantage, between any desired number of independent samples
(ai, ti) ← As,χ (for a uniformly random s ∈ Znq ), and the same number of independent
samples drawn from the uniform distribution over Znq ×Zq. It is often convenient to write
these problems in matrix form as follows: collecting the vectors ai ∈ Znq as the columns of
a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq and the (implicit) error terms ei ∈ Z and values ti ∈ Zq as the entries
of vectors e ∈ Zm, t ∈ Zmq respectively, we are given the input
A, t = Ats + e mod q
and are asked to find s, or to distinguish the input from a uniformly random (A, t). The
LWE problem may also be viewed as an average-case ‘bounded-distance decoding’ problem
on a certain family of lattices: for A ∈ Zn×mq , define the lattice
Λ(At) = {z ∈ Zm : ∃ s ∈ Znq such that z = Ats mod q}.
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Then the t component of the LWE input may be seen as a perturbed lattice point in Λ(At),
to be decoded.
Hardness of LWE. We recall several facts from the literature about the provable hardness
of LWE. The first is that for error distribution χ = DZ,α·q where α · q ≥ 2
√
n, the
search version of LWE is at least as hard as quantumly approximating certain worst-
case problems on n-dimensional lattices to within O˜(n/α) factors [Reg05b].1 Moreover,
for similar parameters and large enough q, search-LWE is at least as hard as classically
approximating the decision shortest vector problem and variants [Pei09]. For moduli q
that are sufficiently ‘smooth’ (i.e., products of small enough primes), the decision form of
LWE is at least as hard as the search form [Reg05b, Pei09].
A particularly important fact for our purposes is that decision-LWE becomes no easier
to solve even if the secret s is chosen from the error distribution χ, rather than uniformly
at random [MR09, ACPS09]. This may be seen as follows: given access to As,χ, we can
draw many samples to obtain
At =
[
At1
At2
]
, t =
[
t1
t2
]
=
[
At1
At2
]
s +
[
e1
e2
]
= Ats + e mod q,
where A2 is uniform, e is drawn from χ, and A1 ∈ Zn×nq is square and invertible. (This
follows by forming A1 by greedily drawing samples that can form an invertible matrix,
and disposing of any others until A1 is complete.) We can then transform A and t into
A¯t := −At2 ·A−t1 mod q, t¯ := A¯tt1 + t2 = A¯te1 + e2 mod q,
where A¯ is uniform; therefore, we have effectively replaced s with the error vector e1. On
the other hand, note that when A, t are uniformly random, then so are A¯, t¯.
In terms of lattices, the above may be interpreted as follows: using the bijection s 7→ At1s
from Znq to itself, we can see that the lattice Λ(At) defined above has as a basis the matrix
H =
[
I
qI −A¯t
]
.
(This basis H is a canonical representation of Λ(At) known as the Hermite normal form.
We have ordered the basis vectors so that the Gram-Schmidt vectors of H are integer
multiples of the standard basis vectors, where the first several have length q, and the
remainder have length 1.) Because Ats mod q ∈ Λ(At), we have t = Ats + e = e mod H,
which is
e−He1 =
[
0
e2 + A¯
te1
]
=
[
0
t¯
]
mod q.
In conclusion, t¯ = A¯te1 +e2 is the unique canonical representative of e modulo the lattice
Λ(At). Finally, assuming hardness of decision-LWE, a standard hybrid argument over the
columns of E (see, e.g., [PW08]) shows that (A¯, A¯tE1 + E2) is indistinguishable from
uniform, where the entries of E =
[
E1
E2
]
are chosen independently from χ.
1It is important to note that the original hardness result of [Reg05b] is for a continuous Gaussian er-
ror distribution, which when rounded naively to the nearest integer does not produce a true discrete
Gaussian. Fortunately, a suitable randomized rounding method does so [Pei10].
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6.3 LWE-Based Encryption
Here we describe an LWE-based cryptosystem that is more space-efficient than the ones
commonly known in the literature. It is an instance of an abstract system described by
Micciancio [Mic10] that generalizes all the schemes of [Reg05b, PVW08, GPV08], though
a full description and analysis of the generalized system has not appeared in the litera-
ture. The security proof combines a number of techniques and perspectives from recent
works [MR09, LPS10, Pei10] for the purpose of improved efficiency and a tight analysis.
For completeness, we also briefly describe an efficient ring-based analogue of the system,
which is described in full generality in the full version of [LPR10].
Despite being a generalization of prior LWE-based cryptosystems, the present scheme can
actually be instantiated to have keys and ciphertexts that are smaller by a factor of about
lg q, while simultaneously improving the concrete security! The improved security comes
from the smaller keys (for given security parameter n), which allows for a relatively larger
noise rate that makes the LWE problem harder. The smaller keys come from a different
style of security proof, which is very similar to the proofs for the coding-based cryptosystem
of Alekhnovich [Ale03] and the subset sum-based cryptosystem of Lyubashevsky, Palacio,
and Segev [LPS10]. In brief, the proof uses the LWE assumption twice (first on the public
key, and then again on the ciphertext) to show that the adversary’s view in a passive
attack is indistinguishable from uniformly random. By contrast, the proofs for prior LWE-
based schemes involve a statistical argument on either the public key or ciphertext, but
this requires larger keys. We point out that statistical arguments still appear necessary
for many advanced applications of LWE, such as identity-based encryption [GPV08] and
others that use a ‘trapdoor basis,’ and we do not know whether comparably small keys
and ciphertexts can be obtained for these schemes.
6.3.1 Cryptosystem
The cryptosystem involves a few parameters: an integer modulus q ≥ 2 and integer
dimensions n1, n2 ≥ 1, which relate to the underlying LWE problems; Gaussian parameters
sk and se for key generation and encryption, respectively; and a message alphabet Σ (for
example, Σ = {0, 1}) and message length ` ≥ 1.
We also require a simple error-tolerant encoder and decoder, given by functions
encode : Σ→ Zq and decode : Zq → Σ,
such that for some large enough threshold t ≥ 1, decode(encode(m)+e mod q) = m for any
integer e ∈ [−t, t). For example, if Σ = {0, 1}, then we can define encode(m) := m · b q2c,
and decode(m¯) := 0 if m¯ ∈ [−b q4c, b q4c) ⊂ Zq, and 1 otherwise. This method has error
tolerance t = b q4c. We also extend encode and decode to vectors, component-wise.
To get the smallest public keys, our system makes use of a uniformly random public
matrix A¯ ∈ Zn1×n2q that is generated by a trusted source, and is used by all parties in the
system. If there is no trusted source, then A¯ may be chosen by the user herself as part of
key generation, and included in the public key.
• Gen(A¯, 1`): choose R1 ← Dn1×`Z,sk and R2 ← D
n2×`
Z,sk , and let P = R1−A¯ ·R2 ∈ Zn1×`q .
The public key is P (and A¯, if needed), and the secret key is R2.
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In matrix form, the relationship between the public and secret keys is:
[
A¯ P
] · [R2
I
]
= R1 mod q. (6.3.1)
• Enc(A¯,P,m ∈ Σ`): choose e = (e1, e2, e3) ∈ Zn1 × Zn2 × Z` with each entry drawn
independently from DZ,se . Let m¯ = encode(m) ∈ Z`q, and compute the ciphertext
ct =
[
ct1 c
t
2
]
=
[
et1 e
t
2 e
t
3 + m¯
t
] ·
A¯ PI
I
 ∈ Z1×(n2+`)q . (6.3.2)
(Note that the first ciphertext component ct1 can be precomputed before P and m
are known.)
• Dec(ct = [ct1, ct2],R2): output decode(ct1 ·R2 + ct2)t ∈ Σ`.
Using Equation (6.3.2) followed by Equation (6.3.1), we are applying decode to
[
ct1 c
t
2
] · [R2
I
]
= (et +
[
0 0 m¯t
]
) ·
R1R2
I
 = et ·R + m¯t,
where R =
[R1
R2
I
]
. Therefore, decryption will be correct as long as each |〈e, rj〉| < t,
the error threshold of decode. (We give a formal analysis in Section 6.3.2 below.)
For another perspective on this scheme as an (approximate) key-agreement mechanism,
let ` = 1 for simplicity. By the discussion in Section 6.2.2, we can interpret key generation
as reducing a Gaussian error vector r modulo a lattice defined by A¯, and publishing the
result A¯r2 − r1 mod q. Likewise, we can view encryption as reducing a Gaussian error
vector e modulo the dual of the same lattice, and publishing the result et1A¯ + e
t
2 mod q.
Using their respective private error vectors and the other party’s public message, the
sender and receiver can both (approximately) compute et1A¯r2 ∈ Zq, whereas a passive
adversary cannot. A formal proof of security appears below in Section 6.3.3.
Ring-based analogue. We briefly describe a very similar scheme that is based on the
decision ring-LWE problem [LPR10]. For messages of length any ` ≤ n = n1 = n2, and
using the same values of n and q as above, the public and secret keys are up to an n factor
smaller than in the above system, namely n lg q or 2n lg q bits at most, depending on the
availability of a common trusted string. (The ciphertext size is the same, namely 2n lg q
bits.)
Let R = Z[x]/f(x) be a polynomial ring for some monic polynomial f(x) that is irre-
ducible over Z; common choices include cyclotomic polynomials such as f(x) = xn + 1
for n a power of 2. (See [LPR10] for efficiency and security properties of this and other
cyclotomic polynomials, including degrees n that are not powers of 2.) Let q ∈ Z be a
sufficiently large integer modulus for which f(x) splits into linear (or very low-degree)
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factors modulo q, and let Rq = R/q = Zq[x]/f(x). Let χk, χe be error distributions over
R that are concentrated on ‘small’ elements of R; see [LPR10] for what error distributions
enable rigorous security proofs.
Let Σ be a message alphabet. The message encoder and decoder are functions
encode : Σn → Rq and decode : Rq → Σn,
such that decode(encode(m) + e mod q) = m for any ‘small enough’ e ∈ R, e.g., one whose
coefficients as a polynomial in Z[x]/f(x) are all in [−t, t) for some integer threshold t ≥ 1.
As above, the system uses a uniformly random a ∈ Rq that can be generated by a
trusted source, or chosen by the user.
• Gen(a): choose r1, r2 ← χk, and let p = r1 − a · r2 ∈ Rq. The public key is p (and a,
if needed), and the secret key is r2.
• Enc(a, p,m ∈ Σn): choose e1, e2, e3 ← χe. Let m¯ = encode(m) ∈ Rq, and compute
the ciphertext [c1 = a · e1 + e2, c2 = p · e1 + e3 + m¯] ∈ R2q .
• Dec(c = [c1, c2], r2): output decode(c1 · r2 + c2) ∈ Σn. By a straightforward calcu-
lation, decryption will be correct as long as e1 · r1 + e2 · r2 + e3 is within the error
threshold of decode; this holds with high probability when χk, χe are sufficiently
concentrated.
The proof of security, under the decision ring-LWE assumption for noise distributions
χk and χe, is essentially identical to the proof of Theorem 6.3.2.
6.3.2 Parameters for Correctness
Here we give an upper bound on the Gaussian parameters sk, se in terms of the desired
per-symbol error probability δ. For reasonably small values of δ, correctness for the entire
message can effectively be guaranteed by way of a simple error-correcting code.
One small subtlety is that if a portion of the random vector e used for encryption
happens to be ‘too long,’ then the probability of decryption error for every symbol can be
unacceptably large. We address this by giving a bound on e, in Equation (6.3.4) below,
which is violated with probability at most 2−κ for some statistical parameter κ (say, κ = 40
for concreteness). We then calculate the error probabilities assuming that the bound holds;
the overall decryption error probability is then no more than 2−κ larger. One can also
modify the Enc algorithm to reject and resample any e that violates Equation (6.3.4); the
adversary’s advantage can increase by at most 2−κ.
Lemma 6.3.1 (Correctness). In the cryptosystem from Section 6.3.1, the error probability
per symbol (over the choice of secret key) is bounded from above by any desired δ > 0, as
long as
sk · se ≤
√
2pi
c
· t√
(n1 + n2) · ln(2/δ)
. (6.3.3)
Here c ≥ 1 is a value that depends (essentially) only on n1 + n2; representative values are
given in Figure 6.1.
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(n1 + n2) c ≥ (sk · se)/t ≤
256 1.35 0.08936
384 1.28 0.07695
512 1.25 0.06824
640 1.22 0.06253
Figure 6.1: Bounds on parameters for Lemma 6.3.1 using a per-symbol error probability
of δ = 0.01, where c is determined so that the probability of choosing a ‘bad’
encryption vector e is at most 2−40.
Proof. As shown above in the specification of the decryption algorithm, the jth symbol of
the message decrypts correctly if |〈e, rj〉| < b q4c. Recall that the entries of e ∈ Zn1+n2+`
are independent and have distribution DZ,se , and rj ∈ Zn1+n2+` is the jth column of
R =
[R1
R2
I
]
, where the entries of R1 and R2 are drawn independently from DZ,sk .
To bound the error probability, let e¯ ∈ Zn1+n2 consist of the first n1 + n2 entries of e.
Then by Lemma 6.2.1, there is a c ≥ 1 such that
‖e¯‖ ≤ c · 1√
2pi
· se
√
n1 + n2 (6.3.4)
except with very small probability (concrete values of c are given in Figure 6.1). For any
fixed e¯ satisfying the above bound, observe that each 〈e, rj〉 is independent and distributed
essentially as 〈e¯, Dn1+n2Z,sk 〉.2 By Lemma 6.2.2, for any T ≥ 0 we have
Pr
[∣∣∣〈e¯, Dn1+n2Z,sk 〉∣∣∣ ≥ T · sk‖e¯‖] < 2 exp(−pi · T 2).
Letting T = t/(sk‖e¯‖), where t is the error tolerance of our message encoding, and using
the bound on ‖e¯‖ from above, we get the bound on sk · se from the lemma statement.
6.3.3 Security Proof
Theorem 6.3.2. The cryptosystem from Section 6.3.1 is CPA-secure, assuming the hard-
ness of decision-LWE with modulus q for: (i) dimension n2 with error distribution DZ,sk ,
and (ii) dimension n1 with error DZ,se.
Proof. It suffices to show that the entire view of the adversary in an IND-CPA attack
is computationally indistinguishable from uniformly random, for any encrypted mes-
sage m ∈ Σ`. The view consists of (A¯,P, c), where A¯ ∈ Zn1×n2q is uniformly random,
P ← Gen(A¯, 1`), and ct ← Enc(A¯,P,m). First, (A¯,P) is computationally indistinguish-
able from uniformly random (A¯,P∗) ∈ Zn1×(n2+`)q under assumption (i) in the lemma
statement, because P = (A¯t)t · (−R2) + R1, and A¯t is uniform while the entries of both
2We ignore the one additional term drawn from DZ,se , which is compensated for by some slack in our
final choice of parameters.
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−R2 and R1 are drawn from DZ,sk . So the adversary’s view is indistinguishable from
(A, c) where A = (A¯,P∗) is uniformly random and c ← Enc(A,m). Now (A, c) is also
computationally indistinguishable from uniformly random (A, c∗) under assumption (ii)
in the lemma statement, because c = (Ate1 + [
e2
e3 ]) + [
0
m ], and A is uniform while the
entries of e1, e2, and e3 are drawn from DZ,se .
It should be noted that for some settings of the parameters, one of the two assumptions
in Theorem 6.3.2 may be true information-theoretically for the number of LWE samples
exposed by the system in an attack. For instance, if n2 ≥ n1 lg q and sk ≥ ω(
√
log n1), then
the public key (A¯,P) is within a negligible (in n1) statistical distance of uniformly random
(by a suitable version of the leftover hash lemma), whereas the corresponding ciphertexts
are statistically far from uniform. These properties are important in, for example, the
‘dual’ cryptosystem and identity-based encryption scheme of [GPV08]. Conversely, the
applications found in [PVW08, BHY09, ACPS09] have public keys that are far from uni-
form, but require that encryption under a ‘malformed’ (uniformly random) public key
produces a ciphertext that is statistically independent of the encrypted message. These
properties are achieved when n1 ≥ n2 lg q and se ≥ ω(
√
log n2), again by the leftover hash
lemma.
6.4 Lattice Decoding Attacks
The most promising practical attacks on the cryptosystem from Section 6.3, and more
generally on LWE itself, use lattice-basis reduction followed by a decoding phase using the
reduced basis.3 In this section we analyze the performance of decoding as it relates to the
quality of a given reduced basis. Then in Section 6.5 we analyze the effort required to
obtain bases of a desired quality.
Before proceeding, we briefly explain how our decoding attack on LWE differs from the
distinguishing attacks considered in other works [MR09, RS10]. In the latter, the adversary
distinguishes (with some noticeable advantage) an LWE instance (A, t = Ats + e) from
uniformly random, which is typically enough to break the semantic security of an LWE-
based cryptosystem with the same advantage. To do this, the adversary finds a short
nonzero integral vector v such that Av = 0 mod q, which may be seen as a short vector
in the (scaled) dual of the LWE lattice Λ(At). (Equivalently, the points of Λ(At) may be
partitioned into hyperplanes orthogonal to v, successively separated by distance q/‖v‖.)
The adversary then simply tests whether the inner product 〈v, t〉 is “close” to zero modulo
q. When t is uniform, the test accepts with probability exactly 1/2, but when t = Ats+e
for Gaussian e with parameter s, we have 〈v, t〉 = 〈v, e〉 mod q, which is essentially a
Gaussian (reduced mod q) with parameter ‖v‖ · s. When this parameter is not much
larger than q, the Gaussian (mod q) can be distinguished from uniform with advantage
very close to exp(−pi · (‖v‖ · s/q)2). For example, when ‖v‖ = 4q/s the distinguishing
advantage is about 2−72. However, to distinguish (and hence decrypt a ciphertext) with
3There are also purely combinatorial attacks on LWE [BKW03, Wag02] that may perform asymptotically
better than lattice reduction, but so far not in practice. Also, these attacks generally require more LWE
samples than our cryptosystem exposes, and an exponentially large amount of space.
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high confidence, one needs ‖v‖ ≤ q/(2s) or so, which usually requires a great deal more
effort to obtain.
It is customary to include the inverse distinguishing advantage in the total ‘cost’ of
an attack, so the computational effort and advantage need to be carefully balanced. For
practical parameters, the optimal total cost of the distinguishing attack typically involves
a very small distinguishing advantage (see Section 6.6), which may not be very useful in
some settings, such as hybrid encryption.
Our decoding attack is stronger than the distinguishing attack in that it can actually
recover the secret error vector in the LWE instance (and hence decrypt the ciphertext)
with the same or better advantage, while using lower-quality vectors. For all the pa-
rameter settings that we investigated, our attack yields a better total effort as a ratio of
time/advantage, and it is significantly more efficient in the high-advantage regime. (See
Section 6.6 and Figure 6.5 in particular for details.) The attack works by using an en-
tire reduced basis (not just one vector), and by expending some additional post-reduction
effort to find the LWE solution. We also point out that unlike in basis reduction, the
post-reduction effort is fully parallelizable.
The attack. Recall from Section 6.2.2 that an LWE instance (A, t = Ats+e) may be seen
as a bounded-distance decoding problem on a certain lattice Λ = Λ(At), where Ats ∈ Λ.
The standard method for solving a bounded-distance decoding problem on lattices is
the recursive NearestPlane algorithm of Babai [Bab85]. The input to the algorithm is some
lattice basis B = {b1, . . . ,bk} (which for best results should be as reduced as possible)
and a target point t ∈ Rm, and the output is a lattice point v ∈ L(B) that is ‘relatively
close’ to t. The precise guarantee is that for any t ∈ span(B), NearestPlane(B, t) returns
the unique v ∈ L(B) such that t ∈ v + P1/2(B˜). In other words, if t = v + e for some
v ∈ L(B), the algorithm outputs v if and only if e happens to lie in P1/2(B˜).
The main drawback of this approach in attacking LWE is that in a reduced basis B, the
last several Gram-Schmidt vectors of B are typically very short, whereas the first few are
relatively long. In such a case, the parallelepiped P1/2(B˜) is very ‘long and skinny,’ and so
the Gaussian error vector e is very unlikely to land in it, causing NearestPlane to produce
an incorrect answer.
We address this issue by giving a generalized algorithm that admits a time/success
tradeoff. It works just as NearestPlane does, except that it can recurse on some di ≥ 1
distinct planes in the ith level of the recursion. In essence, the multiple recursion has
the effect of making the parallelepiped P1/2(B˜) wider in the direction of b˜i by a factor of
exactly di.
4 To capture the most probability mass of the Gaussian error distribution of e,
one should choose the multiples di so as to maximize mini(di · ‖b˜i‖).5
4The algorithm of Klein [Kle00] also can recurse on more than one plane per iteration. Klein’s algorithm
solves the general bounded-distance decoding problem, and selects the planes at each stage probabilisti-
cally (though it can also be derandomized); its guarantee is related solely to the shortest Gram-Schmidt
vector in the basis. Our algorithm is tailored specifically to the setting where we know the distribution
of the offset vector; this allows the algorithm to recurse on exactly those planes that maximize the
probability of success (over the choice of the error vector).
5One could further generalize the algorithm to search within an approximate ball made up of ‘bricks’
that are copies of P1/2(B˜), thus capturing even more of the Gaussian without adding much more to the
54
6.4 Lattice Decoding Attacks
The input to our NearestPlanes algorithm is a lattice basis B = {b1, . . . ,bk} ⊂ Rm, a
vector d = (d1, . . . , dk) ∈ (Z+)k of positive integers, and a target point t ∈ Rm. It outputs
a set of
∏
i∈[k] di distinct lattice vectors in L(B), as follows:
1. If k = 0, return 0. Else, let v be the projection of t onto span(B).
2. Let c1, . . . , cdk ∈ Z be the dk distinct integers closest to 〈b˜k,v〉/〈b˜k, b˜k〉.
3. Return
⋃
i∈[dk]
(ci · bk + NearestPlanes({b1, . . . ,bk−1}, (d1, . . . , dk−1),v − ci · bk).
Note that the recursive calls to NearestPlanes can be run entirely in parallel. The following
lemma is an immediate extension of the analysis from [Bab85].
Lemma 6.4.1. For t ∈ span(B), NearestPlanes(B,d, t) returns the set of all v ∈ L(B)
such that t ∈ v+P1/2(B˜·D), where D = diag(d). The running time is essentially
∏
i∈[k] di
times as large as that of NearestPlane(B, t).
Note that the columns of B˜ ·D from the lemma statement are the orthogonal vectors
di · b˜i, so P1/2(B˜ ·D) is a rectangular parallelepiped with axis lengths di · ‖b˜i‖.
Success probability of NearestPlanes. When t = v + e for some v ∈ L(B) and a con-
tinuous Gaussian e ← Ds for some s > 0, the probability that v is in the output set of
NearestPlanes(B,d, t) is
Pr
[
e ∈ P1/2(B˜ · diag(d))
]
=
m∏
i=1
Pr
[
|〈e, b˜i〉| < di · 〈b˜i, b˜i〉/2
]
=
m∏
i=1
erf
(
di · ‖b˜i‖
√
pi
2s
)
,
(6.4.1)
which follows by the independence of the values 〈e, b˜i〉, due to the orthogonality of the
Gram-Schmidt vectors b˜i. When e is drawn from a sufficiently wide discrete Gaussian
over the integer lattice (in practice, a parameter of 6 or more suffices), the above is an
extremely close approximation to the true probability.
We conclude this section by giving an informal explanation for why the advantage
of the decoding attack can potentially be much larger than that of the distinguishing
attack above, given vectors of the same quality. In the distinguishing attack, using a
vector v of length (say) ‖v‖ ≈ 4q/s implies that 〈v, t〉 mod q is distributed roughly as
D4q modulo q, whose statistical distance is only about 2
−72 from uniform. A basis B of
Λ(At) of equivalent quality has ‖b˜m‖ = q/‖v‖ = s/4, because Λ(At) lies in hyperplanes
orthogonal to v and separated by distance q/‖v‖. So even without using multiple recursion
in NearestPlanes (i.e., letting every dm = 1), the corresponding term in Equation (6.4.1)
is erf(
√
pi/8) ≈ 0.25; moreover, the remaining terms typically approach 1 very rapidly,
since ‖b˜i‖ usually increases quickly as i decreases. Letting di > 1 increases the overall
success probability even more at little added cost, and allows for obtaining a relatively
large advantage without needing higher-quality basis vectors.
search space. However, this would significantly complicate the analysis, and we find that the present
approach is already very effective.
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6.5 Basis Reduction and Experiments
In this section we present an analysis of lattice basis reduction on random q-ary lattices
arising from LWE, and results of reduction experiments on various parameters. Our goal
is to predict a conservative, but still useful, lower bound on the practical runtime of the
lattice decoding attack described in Section 6.4 for a given set of LWE parameters.
We found that the best practical lattice reduction algorithm currently available to us is
the BKZ algorithm as implemented by Shoup in the NTL library [Sho], so this is what we
used in our experiments. The BKZ algorithm is parameterized by a blocksize k between
2 and the dimension of the lattice to be reduced. As the blocksize increases, the reduced
basis improves in quality (i.e., it contains shorter lattice vectors, whose Gram-Schmidt
lengths are closer together), but the runtime of BKZ also rapidly increases, becoming
practically infeasible for k ≥ 30 or so.
There has been some recent progress in the development of algorithms for finding short
vectors in lattices, which can be used as subroutines to (or entire replacements of) BKZ
reduction. For example, Gama, Nguyen, and Regev [GNR10] recently proposed a new
method called “Extreme Enum”, which is much faster than its predecessor, the Schnorr-
Euchner enumeration [SE94]. There are also single-exponential time algorithms for the
Shortest Vector Problem [AKS01, MV10b, MV10a], which can run faster in practice than
Schnorr-Euchner enumeration in certain low dimensions; however, these algorithms also
require exponential space. We were not able to evaluate the performance and effectiveness
of all these approaches, leaving this for future work. The BKZ implementation we use
employs Schnorr-Euchner enumeration and, since the BKZ framework uses the enumera-
tion subroutine as a black box, we presume that new algorithms incorporating Extreme
Enum and other approaches will soon be available for evaluation. (For a comparison of
enumeration algorithms in practice, see the open SVP-challenge website.6)
In Section 6.5.1, we analyze the main properties of BKZ-reduced bases for q-ary lattices
that are relevant to our decoding attack. In Section 6.5.2, we use our experiments to
estimate the runtime required to obtain bases of a desired quality. We point out that the
rest of our analysis is independent of this estimate, and can easily be applied with other
runtime estimates for BKZ variants or other approaches.
6.5.1 Basis Reduction for q-ary Lattices
We begin by reviewing some of the prior work on basis reduction, in particular as applied
to the q-ary lattices that arise from LWE.
The analysis of lattice reduction algorithms by Gama and Nguyen [GN08] identified
the Hermite factor of the reduced basis as the dominant parameter in the runtime of the
reduction and the quality of the reduced basis. A basis B of an m-dimensional lattice Λ
has Hermite factor δm for δ ≥ 1 if ‖b1‖ = δm · det(Λ)1/m. For convenience, we call δ the
root-Hermite factor.
Another important concept is the Geometric Series Assumption (GSA), introduced by
Schnorr [Sch03]. The GSA says that in a BKZ-reduced basis B, the lengths ‖b˜i‖ of the
Gram-Schmidt vectors decay geometrically with i, namely, ‖b˜i‖ = ‖b1‖ · αi−1 for some
6http://www.latticechallenge.org/svp-challenge/
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Figure 6.2: Logarithmic GSO lengths of three LWE instances after BKZ-20 reduction,
which conform to the GSA assumption (modified with fixed upper and lower
bounds on the Gram-Schmidt lengths). In all cases, the observed slope of
the plot is very nearly the same, but other parameters vary. Parameters
are n = 32, q = 257,m = 64 (left); n = 64, q = 257,m = 128 (center);
n = 32, q = 2053,m = 192 (right).
0 < α < 1. Our experiments on random q-ary lattices adhere to the GSA very closely,
with the exception that the Gram-Schmidt lengths are always upper- and lower-bounded
by q and 1 respectively, owing to the special structure of q-ary lattices (see Figure 6.2).
For large BKZ blocksizes that correspond to effective attacks on LWE, these exceptional
cases do not arise, and our bases conform to the GSA as ordinarily stated.
By combining the notion of Hermite factor with the GSA, we can predict the lengths of
all Gram-Schmidt vectors in a basis B (of an m-dimensional lattice Λ) having root-Hermite
factor δ. An easy calculation shows that under the GSA,
det(Λ) =
m∏
i=1
‖b˜i‖ = αm(m−1)/2 · δm2 · det(Λ) =⇒ α = δ−2m/(m−1) ≈ δ−2, (6.5.1)
where the approximation holds for large m.
We now turn to q-ary lattices that arise from LWE. Recall from Section 6.2.2 that LWE
is a bounded-distance decoding problem on the m-dimensional lattice
Λ(At) = {z ∈ Zm : ∃ s ∈ Znq such that z = Ats mod q}
for some A ∈ Zn×mq with m ≥ n. Because the LWE problem allows us to ignore some
of the rows of At (and the corresponding noisy inner products), a natural and important
question is what ‘subdimension’ m makes a lattice attack most effective. This question was
addressed in [MR09], where a simple calculation showed that for a desired root-Hermite
factor δ, the subdimension m =
√
n lg(q)/ lg(δ) is optimal in the context of the natural
distinguishing attack on LWE (as described at the beginning of Section 6.4). The analysis
of [MR09] actually applies to the lattice
Λ⊥(A) = {x ∈ Zm : Ax = 0 mod q},
which is the dual of Λ(At) up to scaling by a q factor, and the optimal subdimension
m given above minimizes the length of d˜1 = d1 in a reduced basis D of Λ
⊥(A) having
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root-Hermite factor δ. In our setting, by duality the same choice of m maximizes ‖b˜m‖ =
q/‖d˜1‖, where the basis B of Λ(At) is the dual basis of D in reverse order.
In our decoding attack (and assuming the GSA), the form of the success probability
given in Equation (6.4.1) as a product of erf(·) terms also strongly indicates that we
should maximize ‖b˜m‖, and hence use the same subdimension m =
√
n lg(q)/ lg(δ) as
above. We do not have a fully rigorous proof of this claim, since using a smaller m
decreases the number of terms in the product, and hence could potentially increase the
success probability. However, it seems unlikely that using a smaller m would improve the
success probability by much (if at all). This is because ‖b˜m‖ = q/‖d1‖ decreases rapidly
as m decreases (see [MR09]), and ‖b˜m−i‖ ≈ ‖b˜m‖·δ2(i−1) is a very close approximation for
small i, which are the Gram-Schmidt vectors that largely determine the success probability.
Likewise, increasing m also appears counterproductive, since it both decreases ‖b˜m‖ and
increases the number of terms in the product.
All of the above assumes that a cryptosystem exposes enough LWE samples (via its
public keys and/or ciphertexts) to use the optimal subdimension. While this is always
true of prior cryptosystems [Reg05b, PVW08, GPV08], it is not necessarily the case for
our cryptosystem in Section 6.3, due to its smaller keys and ciphertexts. In this case, the
adversary should use the dimension m corresponding to the actual number of published
samples (this rule applies to some of our parameters sets given in Section 6.6).
6.5.2 Extrapolating BKZ Runtimes
In order to assign concrete runtimes to the attacks we put forward, we need to predict the
runtime required to achieve a given root-Hermite factor δ in random q-ary lattices.
Gama and Nguyen [GN08] observed that on random lattices generated according to a
variety of models, the runtime required to achieve a given root-Hermite factor δ in large
dimensions (exceeding 200 or so) is largely determined by δ alone; the lattice dimension
and determinant contribute only second-order terms. Our initial experiments confirmed
this behavior for random q-ary lattices, and so we extrapolated runtimes using a fixed set
of LWE parameters q and n, for a variety of values δ that correspond to sufficiently large
optimal subdimensions m =
√
n lg(q)/ lg(δ) ≈ 200. Our experiments were performed on
a single 2.3 GHz AMD Opteron machine, using the single-precision floating-point BKZ
implementation from the standard NTL library [Sho]. (Practical attacks on LWE for
parameters beyond toy examples would require using at least quadruple precision, which
would increase the running times by at least some constant factor, so our extrapolations
are somewhat optimistic and hence conservative from a security point of view.)
Figure 6.3 shows the results of our experiments and their extrapolations. Using the rule
of thumb that obtaining a 2k approximation to the shortest vector in an m-dimensional
lattice takes time 2O˜(m/k) using BKZ, we conclude that the logarithm of the runtime
should grow roughly linearly in 1/ lg(δ). Our limited experiments seem consistent with this
behavior, though many more would be needed to confirm it with confidence. Using least-
square regression, the best linear fit to our data for tBKZ(δ) := lg(TBKZ(δ)), the log runtime
(in seconds, on our machine) of BKZ as a function of δ, is tBKZ(δ) = 1.806/ lg(δ) − 91.
Since our experiments were limited by resources and available time, and we expect to
see further improvements in basis reduction techniques (such as those in [GNR10]), for
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Figure 6.3: Runtime of BKZ experiments on random q-ary lattices, with parameters
n = 72, q = 1021, and m =
√
n lg(q)/ lg(δ0), i.e., the optimal subdimen-
sion with respect to a desired root-Hermite factor δ0. The vertical axis is
tBKZ(δ) := lg(TBKZ(δ)), the logarithmic runtime required to obtain a vector
with root-Hermite factor δ when running BKZ with successively increasing
blocksizes. The horizontal axis is 1/ lg(δ) for the actual root-Hermite factor δ
achieved by the reduction. For comparison, the graph shows the best-fit esti-
mator tBKZ(δ) = 1.086/ lg(δ)− 91, and our conservative lower bound estimate
tBKZ(δ) = 1.8/ lg(δ)− 110.
analyzing concrete hardness we use a conservative lower bound estimate of
tBKZ(δ) := lg(TBKZ(δ)) = 1.8/ lg(δ)− 110. (6.5.2)
Note that in this estimate, the 1.8 factor is very slightly smaller, and the −110 constant
term is substantially smaller, than their counterparts in the best-fit function from our
experiments. We chose the value 1.8 because our experiments were limited to relatively
small block sizes, and the runtimes needed to achieve smaller values of δ very quickly
became infeasible, so we believe that the true coefficient on the linear term (even with
improved algorithms) is larger than 1.8. Similarly, our choice of −110 provides for some
security margin against special-purpose hardware. In conclusion, we believe that our
lower bound estimate provides some safety against foreseeable advances in algorithms
and hardware, but in any case, our analysis is entirely modular and can be immediately
adapted to work with any revised estimator.
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n q s Per-User Full Key Ciphertext Message
Key (P) (P & A¯) (c) Expansion
128 2053 6.77 1.8× 105 3.6× 105 2.8× 103 22.0
192 4093 8.87 2.9× 105 7.4× 105 3.8× 103 30.0
256 4093 8.35 4.0× 105 11.2× 105 4.6× 103 36.0
320 4093 8.00 4.9× 105 17.2× 105 5.4× 103 42.0
136 2003 13.01 2.8× 106 5.8× 106 2.9× 103 22.6
214 16381 7.37 2.4× 106 6.4× 106 4.8× 103 18.7
Figure 6.4: Sizes (in bits) of public keys and ciphertexts for the cryptosystem described
in Section 6.3; for comparison, the last two rows are for parameters given
in [MR09]. In each case, the message size is ` = 128 bits. The “message
expansion” factor is the ratio of ciphertext size to plaintext size. Recall that
in the ring-based system, the public key sizes are about a factor of n smaller.
6.6 Cryptosystem Parameters
We now estimate the concrete security of, and compute the space requirements for, the
LWE-based cryptosystem from Section 6.3 on a variety of parameters, and compare with
the example parameters given in [MR09] for the cryptosystem described therein (which
is essentially due to [PVW08]). Figure 6.4 gives key and ciphertext sizes and Figure 6.5
provides the security estimates.
Instantiating the parameters. We set the cryptosystem’s parameters as n1 = n2 = n
and sk = se = s for some positive integer n and s > 0, so that the two LWE hardness
assumptions made in Theorem 6.3.2 are equivalent. In practice, though, distinguishing
the public key and ciphertext from uniform are not equally hard, because the public key
exposes fewer LWE samples than the ciphertext does. In particular, the adversary cannot
use the optimal subdimension in attacking the public key, making it quite a bit harder
to break. This fact could allow us to use slightly smaller sk and correspondingly larger
se parameters to get slightly stronger overall security, but we elect not to introduce such
complications at this point. (And arguably, the secret key ought to be better-protected
than any individual ciphertext.)
We choose the modulus q to be just large enough (according to the bounds in Figure 6.1)
to allow for a Gaussian parameter s ≥ 8, so that the discrete Gaussian DZm,s approximates
the continuous Gaussian Ds extremely well.
7 Increasing the value of q beyond this thresh-
old appears not to increase the concrete security of our cryptosystem, and (somewhat
paradoxically) may even slightly decrease it! This is because the BKZ runtime depends
almost entirely on the root-Hermite factor δ, and by the constraints on our parameters
(specifically, sk = se = s = O(
√
q)), the δ yielding a successful attack on our system grows
as qΘ(1/n), which increases with q (albeit very slowly).
7Note that the theoretical worst-case reduction [Reg05b] for LWE asks that s ≥ 2√n. However, the
constant factors are not tight, and here we are concerned with concrete hardness against known attacks.
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Adv. ε (Distinguish) (Decode)
n q s lg(ε) δ lg(secs) δ lg(#enum) lg(secs)
≈ 0 ∗1.0065 83 1.0089 47 32
128 2053 6.77 −32 1.0115 < 0 1.0116 13 < 0
(toy) −64 1.0128 < 0 1.0130 1 < 0
≈ 0 ∗1.0045 168 1.0067 87 78
192 4093 8.87 −32 1.0079 49 1.0083 54 42
(low) −64 1.0087 34 1.0091 44 29
≈ 0 ∗1.0034 258 ∗1.0052 131 132
256 4093 8.35 −32 1.0061 96 1.0063 87 90
(medium) −64 1.0067 77 1.0068 73 75
≈ 0 ∗1.0027 353 ∗1.0042 163 189
320 4093 8.00 −32 1.0049 146 1.0052 138 132
(high) −64 1.0054 122 1.0055 117 119
≈ 0 1.0038 219 1.0071 82 68
136 2003 13.01 −32 1.0088 33 1.0092 42 27
[MR09] −64 1.0098 18 1.0102 27 14
≈ 0 1.0053 126 1.0078 66 52
214 16381 7.37 −32 1.0091 28 1.0094 39 25
[MR09] −64 1.0099 17 1.0102 29 14
Figure 6.5: Example parameters and attacks for the LWE-based cryptosystem described in
Section 6.3.1, for various adversarial advantages. The cryptosystem parameters
are n = n1 = n2, q, s = sk = se, and message length ` = 128 bits. For compari-
son, the last two parameter settings (n = 136, n = 214) come from the example
parameters of [MR09]. The columns labelled “Distinguish” refer to a distin-
guishing (i.e., semantic security) attack. These give the root-Hermite factors
δ needed to obtain the respective distinguishing advantages (over the random
choice of the LWE error vector), and the corresponding logarithmic runtime
(in seconds) according to our optimistic estimator from Equation (6.5.2). The
columns labelled “Decode” refer to our decoding (i.e., message and random-
ness recovery) attack. These give example root-Hermite factors and number of
NearestPlanes enumerations needed to obtain the respective decoding proba-
bility, and the corresponding estimated runtime of the attack. Other trade-offs
between δ and the number of enumerations are possible (as δ increases, so does
#enum); we chose the largest δ for which the estimated enumeration runtime
does not exceed that of basis reduction. ∗An asterisk on a value of δ indicates
that for reduced vectors of lengths required by the attack, the cryptosystem
reveals too few LWE samples to allow an optimal choice of subdimension and
corresponding root-Hermite factor δ. In such cases, we used the value of δ
induced by working with the full dimension m = n1 + n2 + ` = 2n+ 128.
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Estimating the security. We analyze the distinguishing attack and our decoding attack
(both described in Section 6.4), estimating the total runtimes for each of a few repre-
sentative adversarial advantages. The attacks apply to a single key and ciphertext; by
a standard hybrid argument, the advantage increases at most linearly in the number of
ciphertexts encrypted under a single key.
For analyzing the basic distinguishing attack we rely on calculations from [MR09]. We
first compute a bound β = (q/s)·√ln(1/ε)/pi on the length of a nonzero vector v ∈ Λ⊥(A)
that would yield the desired distinguishing advantage (taken over the random choice of
the LWE error). We then compute the root-Hermite factor δ = 2(lg
2 β)/(4n lg q) that would
yield such a vector, assuming that the attacker can use the optimal subdimension m =√
n lg(q)/ lg(δ). (The value of δ follows from the fact that in the optimal subdimension, a
root-Hermite factor of δ yields a vector of length 22
√
n lg q lg δ.) If the optimal subdimension
for this δ exceeds n1 + n2 + ` = 2n+ 128 (the number of LWE samples implicitly exposed
by a ciphertext), then we discard this δ and instead use the one for which δm · qn/m = β,
where m = 2n + 128. (Values of δ computed in this way are indicated in Figure 6.5 by
asterisks.) We then calculate a lower bound on the BKZ runtime using our conservative
estimator from Equation (6.5.2).
In analyzing our decoding attack, we try various values of δ, computing both the es-
timated BKZ runtime and the number of enumerations needed (assuming the GSA) to
achieve the desired success probability according to Equation (6.4.1). If the number of
enumerations does not exceed the BKZ runtime (in seconds) by more than a 216 factor, we
consider this to be an acceptable attack. (This 216 factor is somewhat arbitrary, but seems
to be a reasonable estimate on the number of NearestPlanes enumerations that can be per-
formed per second, especially with parallelism.) We list the largest value of δ for which we
found an acceptable attack, along with the corresponding runtime (which includes both
the BKZ and NearestPlanes phases).
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Conclusion
This thesis contains several contributions to practical lattice-based cryptography.
We analyzed the difference between worst-case problems in ideal lattices and worst-case
problems in general lattices. Both are frequently used as security assumptions for lattice
schemes. We found that the instances of ideal lattice problems form a negligibly small
subclass. Though there is no known attack that employs the additional structure of ideal
lattices with notable effect, we still feel that assumptions on ideal lattices should not yet
be used for applications where long-term security is desired. After finishing the analysis,
we focused on practical cryptographic constructions.
Starting with the compression function SWIFFT and using it as an example, we pre-
sented an efficiency improvement that is generally applicable to all known lattice con-
structions based on worst-case problems; technically, we covered constructions based on
(Ideal)SIS and a similar improvement was already known for those based on LWE. We
demonstrated how the SWIFFT design can be generalized to a small range of parameters
without suffering a significant loss in efficiency. Furthermore, we showed that sublattice
attacks are possible against SWIFFT. Using these, we gave evidence that it is feasible to
recover `2-pseudo-collisions for SWIFFT instances in about 2
50 seconds on a modern ma-
chine. Then, we gave replacement parameters for which such pseudo-collisions are harder
to find. Since the SWIFFT compression function is slow compared to other constructions
seen in the SHA-3 competition, it should be used only for high security applications. In
this case, we recommend that our replacement parameters be used to make the recovery
of pseudo-collisions computationally hard.
We went on to study zero-knowledge identification schemes. Here, we adapted a recent
construction by Cayrel and Ve´ron, which is based on assumptions about error-correcting
codes, to lattices. Doing so enabled us to prove security based on worst-case lattice
assumptions and provide a slight efficiency improvement. This makes our construction
the most efficient one known today amongst all that are secure against attackers with
quantum computers. The adaptation of code-based schemes, such as the one presented
here, is often fruitful for both fields. In our case, we found that the soundness of the
code-based scheme was slightly smaller than previously claimed. In general, we find that
63
7 Conclusion
collaborations between these fields are a worthwhile endeavor.
Finally, we discussed public-key encryption. Here, we unified some recent progress into
a clean representation of a scheme that is substantially more efficient than all predecessors.
At the same time, we presented an improved attack for secret-key recovery and decoding
that works against our scheme as well as its predecessors. We found that our attack is
often more efficient than previous ones, and, at the same time, able to achieve more,
because previous attacks only attempt to distinguish ciphertexts from randomness. We
purposefully left our analysis modular with respect to the runtime of lattice basis reduction
algorithms, because there are unpublished improvements in this area that will have a
significant impact. Once these are available, it will be easy to replace the estimator we
provide for the runtime of current algorithms with an updated one.
Further research. In each of the last three chapters we demonstrated that lattice-based
assumptions are well-suited to realize a specific cryptographic construction. Now, a
promising investigation would be to find out specifically how well these or similar con-
structions scale if massive parallel processing is used. Such parallelization is already a
reality today on modern CPUs and graphic cards, and it is reaching smaller devices like
smart-phones. Current research is focused around using parallelization in cryptanalysis,
i.e., to the attacker’s benefit. It seems natural to counter this by using the same techno-
logical advance to improve the efficiency of cryptosystems. Moreover, using parallelism
for the cryptosystem is more powerful. Assume there is a cryptosystem which, by means
of parallelization, may double its main security parameter without a noticeable loss in
efficiency. Then, doubling or even increasing the attacker’s strength a thousandfold will
not even come close to endangering such a system, because the attacker has to overcome
a doubling in the exponent.
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